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Mark J. Scher

To cite this article: Mark J. Scher (1973) U.S. policy in Korea 1945–1948: A Neo-colonial model takes shape, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 5:4, 17-27, DOI: [10.1080/14672715.1973.10406346](https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1973.10406346)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1973.10406346>



Published online: 05 Jul 2019.



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U.S. Policy in Korea 1945-1948:

A Neo-colonial Model Takes Shape

by Mark J. Scher

I. "To Form a Bulwark Against Communism"

With the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, new hopes arose for Korean independence after years of colonial rule. In accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, Soviet troops had already begun to move into Manchuria and northern Korea on August 8 to disarm Japanese troops there.¹ One month later, on September 8, American occupation forces landed in southern Korea.²

The basis for America's Korea policy had been determined long before Japan's defeat. On December 1, 1943, a joint declaration made by the United States, Great Britain, and China at the November Cairo Conference was publicly issued. It called for an independent and free Korea "in due course,"³ and later in December, Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference urged a forty-year trusteeship for Korea, which he likened to the more than forty-year period of U.S. colonization in the Philippines.⁴ The Soviet Union opposed such a long trusteeship, but two years later at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1945, it agreed to a period of less than five years.⁵ By that time, the United States was urging a ten-year trusteeship, but the Soviets urged "the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination of Korea" and the formation of a "provisional Korean democratic government."⁶

The clash between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. over the future of Korea flowed directly from the U.S. desire to gain Soviet help in the war against Japan.⁷ Both at Yalta, and then later at Potsdam, the United States secured a definite Soviet commitment to enter the Far Eastern war by August 8. Before the A-bomb became a workable certainty, General Marshall voiced the opinion at Potsdam that the Russians would indeed be expected to fight alone in Korea.⁸

It was at Potsdam that the disposition of Korea was to be decided. The Soviets had raised the subject several times in a pre-conference exchange of notes concerning the trusteeship of territories detached from enemy states.⁹ At the conference the question was raised by Stalin and Molotov:

Molotov said that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies once and for all. The

question was "who had received them and where had this matter been decided."

*Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered, and the victories which the British army achieved by conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis.*¹⁰

Stalin questioned whether the trusteeship of Korea was to be decided the same way. Truman and Churchill said nothing. Unlike Yalta, Truman had come to Potsdam with extensive background and position papers on Korea and the trusteeship question.¹¹ Why, then, the silence? Churchill had revealed the answer to Stimson that morning:

*[Churchill] told me that he had noticed at the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner... "[Truman] told the Russians just where they got off and on and generally bossed the whole meeting." Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way.*¹²

Confiding in Churchill, Truman had related that he had received word of the successful testing of the atomic bomb in New Mexico. He then informed Ambassador Harriman that if the Japanese surrendered prior to the Soviet occupation, American forces would land in Korea.¹³ This eventuality, however, was not presented to Stalin. Truman immediately ordered a crash program, cost and precautions notwithstanding, to assemble and drop the remaining A-bombs on Japan—before August 8, in an attempt to check Soviet participation.¹⁴ This helps explain the American haste to atomize the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who were the first victims of the "Cold" War rather than the last of the Second World War.

On August 10 Soviet troops began large-scale amphibious operations along the northern coast of Korea and reached as far south as Wonsan by August 16. At this juncture Truman cabled the Soviets requesting for the first time a division of Korea at the 38th Parallel.¹⁵ Truman and Dean

Rusk later revealed that, contrary to wide belief, the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel was never discussed at any of the wartime conferences but came from a suggestion of the U.S. War Department when Secretary of State Byrnes suggested to Truman that American forces be sent into Korea "as far north as practicable."¹⁶ The Soviet Union did not object even though the closest American troops to Korea were in Okinawa, 600 miles away, and did not arrive in Korea until September 8. If Stalin accepted this division in the spirit of cooperation, later events were to show that he was mistaken.

II. Transition: From Colony to Neo-Colony

On August 8 General Abe, Japanese Governor-General of Korea, sent an emissary to the home of the rightist leader Song Jin Woo, requesting him to become civil administrator for Korea. The emissary spoke politely:

*The war is practically over, Mr. Song. . . You must accept the post of administrator. . . There will be bloody riots. Once that happens, there is no telling what will occur politically. Left-wingers might come into control. Bolshevism will take over.*¹⁸

On this subject, the former Japanese Governor-General and the new American occupation authorities were to see eye-to-eye.

Immediately after Japan's surrender in August, the Japanese Governor-General released all political prisoners in exchange for the safety of Japanese nationals.¹⁹ This precipitated a great outpouring of political activity as long-suppressed nationalist and communist groups moved above ground. As the left took charge in the countryside, a broad united national front of nationalists and communists was formed to build native Korean political and economic institutions. This front took form in the People's Committees.

When the U.S. Army XXIV Corps occupation forces arrived on September 8 under the leadership of General Hodge, it was not, as most writers contend, the Japanese Governor-General's nor the Koreans' first postwar contact with the Americans. Four days after Japan's surrender an O.S.S. team of twelve Americans and five Koreans was flown into Korea. Among them was Lee Bum Suk,²⁰ the future premier under Syngman Rhee. Furthermore, an advance party of the XXIV Corps arrived by plane in Seoul on about the first of September. As one high-ranking American Military Government official recalled, the Americans lost little time in settling in:

*No sooner had the group arrived than it took over a suite of rooms in the Chosen Hotel in Seoul—the largest and plushest hotel in Korea—and threw a big party for ranking Japanese military and government officials. Koreans who approached the Americans to discuss their plight were summarily shown the door with a minimum of courtesy. The affair turned into a glorious drunken brawl with the Japanese, which lasted for several days.*²¹

Japanese forces preserved the southern zone intact for the arriving Americans, and as the Soviets moved towards the 38th Parallel, they sabotaged mines and factories in the north before retreating to the American zone to accept surrender.²² The Japanese commander in Seoul radioed to General Hodge, who had not yet arrived:

Communists and independence agitators are plotting to

take advantage of this situation to disturb the peace and order.

Hodge cabled back instructions for the Japanese to keep their troops armed; the Japanese commander then replied that he was "extremely grateful to have received your understanding reply."

A few days before they landed, American airplanes leafleted south Korea with directives charging the people to be obedient to "orders passed to you through the current Korean government," and adding the warning: "Do not participate in demonstrations against the Japanese or in welcome to American armed forces. Go about your normal pursuits." When Koreans marched to the waterfront to greet the landing Americans, Japanese police opened fire on the crowd, killing two and wounding ten. They had acted with the authority of the U.S. command.²³

Upon his arrival Hodge immediately ordered the Japanese to gather and guard all weapons, telling General Sugai: "What I want is to get them where Koreans won't get hold of them, and so they don't get spread all over the country."²⁴ In those first days after liberation, the Japanese were still broadcasting Domei news agency reports over the radio, remaining in control of the newspapers as well. Japanese policemen could be seen guarding Japanese property and marching in groups through the streets wearing armbands marked "USMG"—United States Military Government. Trucks carrying armed Japanese soldiers could be seen in the streets bearing the sign: "Japanese Army Detachment: Understood by the U.S. Army." Under U.S. Army direction, the Allied flags put up by Koreans were torn down by Japanese soldiers. Korean flags which sprouted everywhere for the first time since the annexation were seized.²⁵

III. The Provisional Government, The People's Committees: "The Yellow Hope," "The Red Peril"

Inheriting the mantle of Japanese colonialism, General Hodge moved into the green-roofed mansion of the Japanese Governor-General.²⁶ He immediately drew together an "Advisory Council," similar to the "Central Advisory Council" during Japanese rule, composed of well-known Korean collaborators. Yu Uk Kyum, who had made recruiting speeches for the Japanese during the war urging young Koreans "to die for the fatherland," was to head the Department of Education.²⁷ Douku Sun, who was made head of the Korean Electric Company, had been president of the Women's Kindergarten and Normal School during the Japanese occupation, when he regularly reported anti-Japanese teachers to the secret police.²⁸ When the Military Government finally ordered a "strict" purge of collaborators who were working in the government, it was only able to discover one official against whom they could make this charge.²⁹

Hodge discovered on his arrival that the country was being effectively run by the People's Committees, which were carrying out all the functions of government as well as operating former Japanese enterprises on a cooperative basis for the benefit of the employees.³⁰ Rather than use the People's Committees, which were the indigenous Korean political, economic, and administrative organs, Hodge instead sought the immediate resurrection of the Japanese administrative structure. This involved the use of the police for

about a month because the Japanese Government-General had ceased functioning. In the northern zone, in contrast, the Soviet occupation forces cooperated with the popular movement, leaving civil administration to the People's Committees.³¹

Concrete detail concerning the way in which the American Military Government (USAMGIK) acted to circumvent and ultimately destroy the People's Committees is provided by Richard Robinson, the chief of the Public Opinion Section of the Department of Information of the USAMGIK and later a historian attached to Intelligence headquarters (G2) of the XXIV Corps:

It was safe to say that for the most part the local People's Committees in these early days were of the genuine grassroots democratic variety and represented a spontaneous urge of the people to govern themselves. . . . They resented orders from the Military Government to turn the administration of local government over to American Army officers and their appointed Korean counterparts, many of whom were considered to be Japanese collaborators. It seemed like a reversion to what had gone before. Bloodshed ensued in many communities as local People's Committees defied the Military Government and refused to abandon government offices. Koreans and Americans met in pitched battles, and not a few Koreans met violent death in the struggle.

For instance, there was the case of Namwon, a small community in North Cholla Province. The Japanese had turned over considerable property to the local People's Committee just prior to the arrival of the Americans. The Military Government demanded the property, but the People's Committee refused to renounce title. Whereupon, five leaders of the Committee were arrested by the local Korean police. Shortly thereafter, the police chief was captured and beaten by Committee members and the police station attacked by a large crowd of irate citizens. The station was guarded by American troops. When the Koreans refused to disband, the Americans advanced with fixed bayonets. Two Koreans were killed and several injured. This incident was typical of many such cases.³²

The American Forces in Korea (USAFIK) were under the over-all command of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo. As commander-in-chief of Allied Forces in the Pacific MacArthur had issued *Proclamation No. 2 to the People of Korea*, which threatened a penalty of death to Koreans who violated USAFIK directions.³³ Other directives from MacArthur's headquarters followed: No. 55 (February 23, 1946) required three or more persons who might associate for political purposes, including public discussion, to register with the Military Government. No. 19 required all newspapers and other publications to be licensed and copies sent to the Military Government.³⁴ Ordinance No. 72 gave blanket authority to the Military Government for the arrest of anyone who "publishes, imports, circulates printed, typed, or written material which is detrimental or disrespectful to the occupying forces" or for "attendance at any public gathering, parade, or demonstration for which no permit has been granted."³⁵

The American Military Government also attempted to atomize the political united front which was the essence of the widespread support for the People's Committees. They

requested and received the registration of over 425 parties, groups, committees, and clubs which were then to act on a consultative basis with the Military Government. Many groups had less than a handful of members and were rightist in philosophy.³⁶

As Robinson has perceptively pointed out, the American action rivaled the much-hated "thought control" laws of the Japanese, although the Military Government asserted it "merely wanted the information to better understand Korean politics." However, he pointed out, "the pile of paper which accumulated defeated all presumed purposes since there were not enough translators and analysts to extract anything of value"—except for one purpose: "to drive into the open the activities of the Communist Party, both financially and otherwise."³⁷

As one observer noted, it was "no secret that the Military Government favored the right and was anxious for the parties of the right to acquire strong popular support."³⁸ Thus it promoted exile groups without any popular support such as the rightist Korean Provisional Government led by Kim Koo. Breaking his pledge to return only as a private citizen, Kim modestly announced, "When I return, the government of Korea returns." A "Provisional Government" complete with cabinet was proclaimed with support from the American command. Its headquarters were established at the Dawk Soo Palace, ringed by armed Korean guards despite the general confiscation of weapons by the American command. The day after Kim's arrival, he was introduced to the local press in the Throne Room of the capital by the Military Governor himself.³⁹ Americans then went on to print a lengthy address and a portrait of Kim in the December 8 edition of the *Chukan Digest*, the official publication of the Military Government. Although Kim made references to "my cabinet members,"⁴⁰ the Military Government, contradictorily, as a further measure to discredit the leftist Korean People's Republic, banned the use of the word "republic," saying that the Military Government was the sole government.⁴¹

Of all the political exiles, the most notorious was Syngman Rhee, who was eventually to become president for a dozen years. Rhee, a diplomatic butterfly of aristocratic lineage, had spent forty years in exile, placing his hopes on the expectation that U.S. imperialism's inevitable interests in the Far East would carry him back to Korea. His day finally arrived. On October 16, 1945, he arrived in Seoul on General MacArthur's personal airplane. His quick passage from Washington had been arranged by Colonel Millard Preston Goodfellow.⁴²

At MacArthur's "suggestion" Hodge had reserved a three-room suite at the Chosen Hotel for Rhee, and on October 20 presented "private citizen" Rhee at a welcoming rally as a returned national hero. At the rally Rhee proceeded in his address to attack the Soviet occupation of the northern zone.⁴³ This was no surprise since Rhee had proven himself over the years to be a vehement anti-communist. On December 7, 1942, the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, he marked the occasion by sending Secretary of State Cordell Hull a letter warning that unless Rhee's "Provisional Republic of Korea" was accorded diplomatic recognition, the result would inevitably be "the creation of a communist state" in Korea by the Russians.⁴⁴

During the war Rhee's sponsor, Colonel Goodfellow, was not only an associate of the future president, but a deputy

director of the O.S.S. Rhee had assisted Goodfellow in the recruitment of Koreans for covert operations in Korea.⁴⁵ Their association did not end when Rhee left for Korea, however, since Goodfellow arrived shortly afterward at Hodge's request as a political adviser. His first task was to set up the Korean Advisory Council around Rhee.⁴⁶ As the anointed one, Rhee was given special status and privilege. He was given a fifteen-minute weekly radio program to air his personal views (even these were censored by the Americans after the spring of 1946), while two rightist and two moderate political parties were given only fifteen minutes *monthly* for radio broadcasts, which were censored by the Military Government from the beginning.⁴⁷ On December 26, 1945, Rhee was allowed to broadcast a vehement attack against the Soviet Union for the trusteeship agreement just concluded at the Moscow Conference, in spite of the fact that the trusteeship concept had originated in Washington.⁴⁸ Indeed, Rhee's "nationalism" seemed to be his one source of rapport with the Korean people.

The American plans to use the exile Korean Provisional Government of Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee are documented from a variety of government sources. These plans advocated the development of a "nuclear organization . . . which would in the initial stage be formed around Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, and Kim Ki-sic."⁴⁹ For this purpose, Secretary of State Byrnes on October 16 instructed Ambassador Hurley in China to allow Kim Koo and Kim Ki-sic to return to Korea.⁵⁰ MacArthur revealed further plans:

I plan to utilize the services of Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo to help screen additional Koreans to be brought to Korea, to get support fully behind the economic rehabilitation plans of the current Military Government and to establish a representative and expanded coalition advisory council to aid in renovating Government machinery and placing suitable and representative Koreans in responsible Government positions both as working members and as titular heads below the top of the Central Government.

This line of action can be expanded at any stage to include Korean territory not now under United States occupation provided it is released.⁵¹

In a November 13 report it was found that General Hodge had been "seeing quite a bit of Dr. Rhee and had found him helpful," and "was using him then in negotiations with the communist leaders."⁵² The State Department Political Advisor in Korea later that month reported that General Hodge had directed Kim Koo to form a council to study and prepare the form of government for Korea and to organize a Government Commission, with the Military Government providing facilities, advice, and working funds. At the end of his report, the advisor noted that on November 13 Military Government Ordinance No. 28 had "created the office of Director of National Defense and Bureau of Armed Forces therein which has as its aim organizing, training, and equipping armed Korean military and naval forces."⁵³

Because of these American attempts to create what can only be interpreted as an artificially viable Korean government in the southern zone, the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of December 1945 had decided, under American pressure, on a ten-year trusteeship for Korea, and not independence. Indeed, General Hodge in an address to the Koreans tried to lay the blame for this unpopular decision

upon the Soviets, although this was completely contrary to the facts. The Soviets, annoyed with Hodge's allegations, decided to lay bare the truth: that it was the Americans who needed and wanted the trusteeship; and that, furthermore, the American draft at the conference did not even provide for a national Korean government during the trusteeship period.⁵⁴ The Military Government censored this TASS report, claiming that no Koreans had requested that it be publicized. However, the chief of the Public Opinion Section, Department of Information of the USMG, recalls:

The Americans had claimed repeatedly that there was no such thing as censorship of legitimate news in South Korea. General Lerch, the Military Governor, stated that no request to broadcast the TASS release had been received and, therefore, it could not have been censored. However, to my personal knowledge, such a request had been made, and Military Government authorities had ordered that the TASS statement be killed.⁵⁵ [emphasis added]

Robinson reports that public opinion polls taken by the Military Government at that time indicated that with the subsequent exposure of the truth, American prestige in Korea sank to a new low. To the Russians it made clear that the Americans were out to increase their own prestige and influence in Korea at the expense of the Soviet Union, even if that meant torpedoing the just-concluded Moscow Agreement.⁵⁶

General Hodge, caught in his unwitting lie, radioed the State Department in Washington about the proposed ten-year trusteeship, asking just what its policy on Korea was. This prompted Secretary of State Byrnes to inquire of Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal,⁵⁷ in a letter dated April 1, 1946, about Hodge's basic ignorance of Washington's position. This was particularly hard to understand since in December a draft trusteeship agreement, drawn up in the State Department, had been sent to Hodge, and on October 13, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had sent Hodge a lengthy document entitled *Basic Initial Directive for the Administration of Civil Affairs in Those Areas of Korea Occupied by U.S. Forces*, which also dealt with the trusteeship question.⁵⁸ In fact, Hodge had not received any of these directives.

At this point State Department documents a half-year old and even older began to arrive in Seoul from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo where they had been withheld.⁵⁹ By that time it was already too late to follow all the State Department recommendations, such as to include moderates in the government coalition, but Hodge's advisors tried to dress up their rightist coalition with a few for appearance's sake. MacArthur seemed to have effectively manipulated Hodge into taking a more actively anti-Soviet policy than seems to have been contemplated by the civilian establishment.

IV. The Failure of the Joint Commission

In the early months of 1946 the American-Soviet Joint Commission first met to implement the provisions for reunification and the formation of a provisional government as stipulated in the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference Agreement. On the first day, March 20, the American side headed by General Arnold attempted to turn the Commission into a propaganda show by demanding the issuance of daily

communiques and the freedom to issue unilateral statements. The Russians insisted that communiques be issued after something had been decided, but finally agreed that at least one communique would be issued each week.⁶⁰ Little progress was made. The United States insisted that the rightist groups which vehemently opposed the provisions of the trusteeship agreement should participate in the consultations of the Joint Commission and in the provisional government. The Soviets saw the inclusion of the anti-trusteeship parties as undermining the whole trusteeship concept delineated in the Moscow Agreement, but were willing to allow the participation of Korean groups who previously opposed trusteeship (mostly leftist nationalists probably) but were willing to change and sign a declaration of support for the Moscow Agreement. General Hodge, realizing the strength of Soviet influence on portions of the Korean left, then declared that anti-trusteeship groups who signed such a declaration (his concern was with the right-wing groups) were not required to abide by it since that would limit their free speech. The Soviets refused to follow such logic.⁶¹ The American-appointed Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court publicly declared that those who supported the trusteeship should either die or be sent to Russia. One official later wrote about this and said:

Of course the real explanation of the American stand lay in the fact that the primary mission of the occupation of South Korea was not so much to establish a Korean democracy as to establish a bulwark against the expanding influence of Soviet ideology. General Hodge privately admitted as much on several occasions. The trusteeship issue was raised to embarrass the Soviet Command so as to put it in the unpopular position of insisting upon trusteeship.⁶³

It could be added that it was also raised to embarrass the Korean left as a simple tool of Soviet policy. Indeed, the trusteeship issue did play such a role among left-wing parties, groups, and individuals.

V. An Attempt to Change Horses

Having reached an impasse with the Soviets on the Joint Commission, the United States sought to strengthen its hand against the Soviets by threatening to create a separate and viable "independent" South Korean interim government. As outspoken rightists, Rhee and Kim Koo could not be portrayed as centrists in a viable coalition, so the U.S. Military Government turned to Kim Ki-ic and persuaded him to fill this role. General Hodge naturally met opposition from Rhee, who previously had been put in a preeminent place in Korean politics, and important leaders of the non-communist left, such as Lyuh Woon Hyung, shied away from this artificially created "coalition."⁶⁴ This left Hodge's political adviser, Lieutenant Leonard Bertsch, the task of working with the membership lists of various defunct and embittered Communist Party factions, many of whose members, anxious for Korean independence, had become ideological anti-communists and renegades who could serve to help split the left wing of Korean politics.⁶⁵ Bertsch, for example, attempted to buy off a former officer in the Korean Federation of Labor, an organization which had been driven underground by political suppression,⁶⁶ but whose officials were now offered the "carrot" of cooperation with U.S. goals.

Finally, in the fall of 1946, the U.S. succeeded in

establishing an Interim Legislative Assembly having 90 members. Half of these were simply appointees of the USMGIK; the other half were to be elected according to one of two proposed electoral systems.⁶⁷ The first plan, which proposed universal suffrage, was rejected. Instead, each hamlet, village, and district would "elect" two representatives. In fact, the election rules were identical to those followed under Japanese occupation; only taxpayers and landlords voted, and in some areas village headmen simply appointed representatives.⁶⁸ These representatives would then elect other representatives at the *myun* level, and the process would be repeated for the *gun* level; finally, the *gun* electors selected the provincial assemblymen who elected representatives to the Interim Assembly. The purpose of this complex filtration system of elections was simply to prevent the left from electing its candidates to the Assembly, a probability widely accepted if the universal suffrage proposal were implemented fairly.⁶⁹

The actual implementation of even these election rules, however, left a lot to be desired in terms of fairness. Indicative of the general political situation in Korea below the 38th Parallel was the report of the journalist Mark Gayn, made on a trip to Pusan in October 1946. Upon his arrival he was informed by Lieutenant Colonel H. O. Benton, Deputy Military Governor, that there were 1,300 political prisoners in the province.⁷⁰ Observing the effect of this upon the election, C. V. Bergstrom, Chief of Home Affairs, commented: "Strategically, this is the proper time for the rightists to hold the elections. All the leftists are either in jail or in the hills."⁷¹

In the rural districts, Gayn had a first-hand opportunity to observe one county's election for delegates to the Pusan Provincial Assembly. In the county Gayn visited, the two most important organizations had been the Farmers Union, to which nearly all of the 20,000 sharecroppers of the county belonged, and the Youth Alliance. However, it was not yet safe enough to hold elections until these two organizations had been suppressed and 400 imprisoned. The seventeen candidates were as follows: six "farmers"; five village headmen; two landlords; a sake brewer; a fire department chief; a monk; and an organizer for Hanguk Minchudang (Korean Democratic Party). On closer inspection, the "farmers" turned out to be landlords. One, whose father owned 36 acres, was the president of the Farm Credit Association, the president of the Deep Sea Fishers Association, and the president of the Association to Suppress Disturbances. The election procedure was orderly since the fifty headmen cast all the ballots on behalf of the entire population.⁷² As one American who was active in the grassroots organizing of the election commented, upon his arrival he "organized a posse and raided some houses, raided the headquarters of the Farmers Union, and helped to get the Hanguk Party going."⁷³

VI. The Political Role of Korean Comprador Capitalism

A cornerstone of American policy in postwar Korea was to foster the growth and consolidation of a native group whose interests would coincide with America's. Given the general nature of U.S. global interests, the development of a class of compradors in Korea, based on the few Korean "nationalist" capitalists, was a logical step. Syngman Rhee's connection with

this group is disclosed in the following account of a private meeting, held on December 16, 1945, ostensibly to discuss the food crisis.

My interpreter turned and whispered to me in awed tones, 'These are the millionaires of Korea.' It soon developed that the group was in the throes of organizing itself as the Economic Contributors Association, the self-avowed objectives of which were: (1) to prove to the public that the wealthy men of Korea were patriotic, and (2) to solicit funds for the Korean Provisional Government. The aim was to be 200,000,000 yen (at least two million dollars as measured by comparative purchasing power). Dr. Rhee was named as the agent for the Provisional Government in the deal. Promissory notes for large sums were made out on the spot by a number of those present. When I reported the matter to American authorities, I was told to forget about it. Somehow, however, news of the transaction leaked out to the local press, and Dr. Rhee was charged with having accepted a large sum of money from the wealthy of Korea, most of whom had amassed their fortunes under the Japanese by exploiting their fellow countrymen. Whereupon, Dr. Rhee publicly denied having anything to do with such a project. Army intelligence reports as well as my own eyes would have it differently.⁷⁴

In trying to foster the development of a reliable middle-class ally in the Korean context, the USMGK began instituting a "free-trade" policy with disastrous economic consequences. Under the Japanese, there had been a rigid system of crop control and collection. The U.S. policy simply ended these controls, thus encouraging businessmen and landlords to speculate in the grain and other commodity markets. The principal hoarders were the "respectable" and powerful businessmen that the U.S. authorities were nurturing and relying on for advice. Thus, the Military Government did nothing to stop them or the speculation.⁷⁵

In addition, smuggling began to make its appearance, aggravated by the potential pay-offs given the shortages that hoarding and speculation had created. Rice was smuggled to Japan to be traded there for luxury items which were smuggled back into Korea and sold for enormous profits. It is estimated that nearly one-quarter of the 1945 rice harvest was smuggled out of Korea.⁷⁶ Within weeks the entire 1945 crop was off the domestic market. Even though the crop was larger than the previous year by 60%, and even though the usual 50% was not legally shipped to Japan as in the past, nor was any of it to head north of the 38th Parallel, prices soared and people went hungry. The Korean press beseeched the Military Government to take action against the profiteers. General Arnold's answer to the press was that: "In a democracy the free play of supply and demand must be allowed to operate unhampered; any control imposed on that free play would operate against the democratic system of government."⁷⁷

The situation was even worse in the countryside where 80% of Korea's population lived as peasants. In 1945 over two-thirds of the cultivated land was owned by 3% of the population. Rents to absentee landlords amounted to from 40% to 80% of the crop in addition to the taxes which the tenants were required to pay.⁷⁸ Gayn reports in a visit to Yenho in Kosan county near Taegu that half the yield of the crops were being collected for the landlords by the Military Government, even though the maximum rental was supposed

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to be only one-third of the crop. During the Japanese occupation the Rural Credit Association had charged 24% interest per year on loans, but under the Military Government the landlords were able to get 60%.⁷⁹ In a previous inquiry Gayn had made about land reform, he was told by an American official: "That's not important. Remember that the present system is the system they're used to."⁸⁰

By far the largest landlord in Korea was the Japanese-owned Oriental Development Company. It owned 64% of Korea's dry lands and 80% of its rice lands, as well as 350,000 acres of forests. In addition, it controlled shipbuilding yards, the textile industry, the iron mines, the shoe factory, and the alcohol refinery. The \$700 million enterprise was renamed The New Korea Company, its assets officially being held by the Military Government. However, the Korean collaborators who had worked for the Japanese now ran it for their own benefit under American supervision.⁸¹

In the effort to strengthen and secure victory for the Korean right, labor unions became a major focus of attention. The Dai Han Labor Union was set up by Syngman Rhee's supporters to compete with the Chawn Pyang Labor Union, which had to be crushed by the police because of its political strength.⁸² Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, economic advisor to General Hodge and a member of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, described the situation as follows:

Police activity with regard to disputes between the two parties' labor unions has taken the form of assistance to the Dai Han right-wing labor organization in a policy of bands off where they have been concerned. On the other hand, the Chawn Pyawng had been subject to strict police surveillance exercised towards them and certain punitive measures such as the arrest of members for distributing handbills and roundups following strike activity.⁸³

Typical of the right-wing labor activities were the actions of the pro-Rhee organizers in the important industrial areas of Samchok. On July 24, 1946, Robinson interviewed the man responsible for organizing labor in the area for Rhee's National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence:

By his own admission he had been a large factory owner under the Japanese and head of the Financial Association in the area, the organization through which the Japanese kept the farming population under control. According to his own statement made to me on that date, labor unions should not be encouraged and certainly not for economic purposes; they should be mere political adjuncts. He frankly admitted that he did not believe in collective bargaining.

When I made inquiry about what happened to the left-wing unions in the district which I knew had been very strong only a few months previous, he replied that the left-wing labor leaders had been imprisoned for dabbling in politics and operating a school for the workers.⁸⁴

VII. Police State Policy: Undermining the People's Committees

Based on its success on a national level during the previous year, in November 1946 the USMGK formed provincial Advisory Councils and encouraged the rapid

formation of new parties and associations to be represented on the new body.⁸⁵ Taking South Cholla as a typical case, the composition of its Advisory Council was hardly representative. It included a minister, a lawyer, a banker, a district magistrate, a journalist, a professional politician, and several businessmen. No farm leaders were among its members.⁸⁶

In the spring of 1946 a new American Military Governor of the province of South Cholla was appointed. The new man was a strong anti-communist who openly sided with the local right-wing goon squads by imprisoning or fining leftist groups and individuals while chiding and warning the rightists.⁸⁷ As Meade points out, "the right flourished best when it had a well-armed police force behind it."⁸⁸ One American advisor was told that "while the State Department expected the Military Government to continue operating behind a facade of political neutrality, the Americans were expected to make every effort to secure a rightist victory."⁸⁹

The police were naturally an important weapon of the Military Government against the left. In 1945 during Japanese rule there had been 23,000 police in Korea; 9,000, or nearly 40%, were Koreans. Of these, 85% were retained by the Military Government, including most of those from the north who had fled south and who had records of brutality in arresting and torturing their fellow countrymen. The 14,000 repatriated Japanese police were replaced by an additional 15,000 Koreans, bringing the total in South Korea to more than that of all of Korea under the Japanese. The Military Government, in addition, provided more advisors for the police than for any other aspect of the government.⁹⁰ As William Maglin, the American chief of the occupation's Police Department stated:

Many people question the wisdom of keeping men trained by the Japanese. But many men are born policemen. We felt that they did a good job for the Japanese, and they would do a good job for us.⁹¹

Of the 140 police officers of the rank of captain, 110 had served under the Japanese. In Seoul every one of the ten precinct chiefs was Japanese-trained, as were eight of the ten provincial chiefs in the American zone.⁹² The National Director of the police organization, Dr. Cough Byung Ok, and Chang Taik Sang, Chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police, were active members of the right-wing Hanguk Democratic Party; both had prospered during the Japanese occupation. One of the top American supervisors commented that there was enough evidence in his files to hang them both several times over, but they were not to be removed on the direct order of General Hodge.⁹³

Beginning on January 18-19, 1946, the police made widespread attacks against the left. Hundreds were arrested, and the police were later commended by the Military Government for their initiative.⁹⁴ Left-wing leaders were imprisoned on charges of being involved in the "illegal" transaction of enemy property. In September, Hodge ordered three left-wing newspapers closed, and many prominent Communist leaders including the Party Chief were arrested.⁹⁵ Even the rightist nationalist leader, Kim Kiisic, was moved to protest to the Military Government, urging an invalidation of the election because of police harassment of the left.⁹⁶

But the persecution continued. On September 14, 1946, the South Korean Railroad Workers Association presented a

list of demands to the Department of Transportation of the Military Government for the restoration of a rice ration, restoration of monthly salary instead of the newly instituted per diem wage, restoration of the daily lunch, and the

restoration of jobs, all of which the workers had had under Japanese rule. When the railway workers finally struck on September 28, General Hodge decried the act, although the workers' demands had been totally ignored, and he then declared it illegal.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, from Pusan to Seoul the railway men walked off their jobs. In Seoul more than 2,000 workers were arrested; many other unions went on strike in sympathy,⁹⁸ bringing the total number of strikers to 300,000. In Taegu, on October 3, the police shot and killed a railroad striker. The next morning, as the worker's body was carried through the streets, the police tried to halt the procession by force of arms. Fifty-four police were killed as the population rose in rebellion which spread from Taegu around the country. Martial law was declared in two provinces and 8,000 persons were arrested.⁹⁹

Although General Hodge charged that North Korean agitators had engineered the whole rebellion, not one of the thousands arrested was not a bona fide resident of South Korea.¹⁰⁰ A virtual state of terror existed in southern Korea. Mark Gayn relates how on his arrival in Korea in the fall of 1946 he observed a flight of fighter planes staging mock dive-attacks on villages. The Army lieutenant accompanying him explained that it was an example of "psychological warfare—to show these gooks we won't stand for any monkey-business."

VIII. The Korea Lobby: McCarthy, the Cold War, and Rhee's Return

By the fall of 1946 it became apparent to Rhee and his group that rhetoric about Korean unity to the contrary, his best hope for reaching power would be through the creation of a separate south Korean state. One source cites American intelligence sources as having information to the effect that Rhee was even thinking of instigating a border conflict between the United States and Soviet occupation forces to ensure against a possible U.S.-Soviet agreement on reunification.¹⁰² Ominous references were made by Rhee's Washington representative about an impending civil war "endangering United States soldiers in a cross-fire."¹⁰³ Concerned that the impending second Joint Soviet-American Commission meeting might achieve the unlikely possibility of an understanding on reunification, Rhee decided to return to Washington. He felt this was a particularly propitious time to go because of the Republican victory in the 1946 Congressional elections. He commented several times that "his friends" were in power again and that he would have no trouble getting his ideas across to the right people.¹⁰⁴

In order to finance Rhee's non-political diplomatic mission, banks and business houses ordered their employees to contribute specified sums from their salaries. The Home Affairs Minister of the Provisional Government, Shin Ik Hi, toured the country, giving the impression that the collection was a semi-official one. By the end of the year, the immediate goal of the equivalent of \$300,000 had been surpassed.¹⁰⁵

The only way of transferring this money out of Korea would have been by exchanging Korean currency for dollars through the Army Finance Office; any other method was

specifically prohibited. Since Rhee's funds would then be limited and Rhee himself held accountable for the money, his missionary friends rescued him from this financial dilemma. Several mission-supported institutions pooled their dollar credits in the United States and "donated" to Rhee's accounts a large sum of money. Rhee, in turn, "contributed" large sums of Korean currency to the institutions concerned in Korea. The whole transaction was illegal from start to finish. When this transaction was brought to the attention of General

Hodge, he failed to see anything which would warrant prosecution. As one of his legal experts commented, "A G.I. would break rocks a helluva long time for the same offense."¹⁰⁶

On the morning of December 2, 1946, Rhee left Korea aboard a special United States Army plane provided for him by orders of General MacArthur's headquarters. On his way to the United States, Rhee stopped off in Tokyo for a private meeting with MacArthur, staying at the Imperial Hotel, reserved then for high-level Allied personnel.¹⁰⁷ In Washington Rhee's advance work had been done by Louise Yim (Soon Kyo Han) who had set up a permanent lobbying office. Yim had left Korea on this mission several months earlier, magically financed through the help of missionary friends.¹⁰⁸ Rhee then met with his advisors and friends. Among them were John W. Stagers, a Washington attorney, and Jay Jerome Williams, a public relations man, both of whom were linked with a company designed to develop Korean trade possibilities. Others were Robert T. Oliver of Syracuse University and Preston Goodfellow, owner of the *Brooklyn Eagle* and former political advisor to General Hodge in Korea. Both Goodfellow and Oliver had been mentioned by Rhee in a speech given in the spring of 1946 as parties interested in the establishment of a Korean-American Trading Company, a company designed to "monopolize Korean foreign trade." Others, according to U.S. military intelligence reports, were key figures in the McCormick and Hearst newspaper chains.¹⁰⁹

With powerful friends in the American mass media, Rhee began putting out statements attacking "obscure elements" in the State Department who, he claimed, were "blocking the fulfillment of the American pledge to bring independence to Korea." He charged (perhaps not without some truth) that State Department policy was contrary to the goals of General MacArthur, and, for good measure, he charged General Hodge with being soft on communism.¹¹⁰

Given the atmosphere of burgeoning Cold War attitudes, fanned to high temperature by the nascent McCarthyism of the period, Rhee's strategy quickly silenced the opposition to him in the American government. In mid-March, a press leak claimed that an American-financed economic rehabilitation program was being planned for south Korea with the sum of \$600 million.¹¹¹ The Associated Press commented that it was "a sweeping victory for Dr. Rhee who for the past few months has been urging changes along the lines outlined."¹¹² After four months in Washington, it was time for Rhee to return triumphantly to Seoul.

On his way back, Rhee stopped in Tokyo for consultations with MacArthur, and from there flew on to Shanghai to meet with Chiang Kai-shek. He finally returned to Seoul aboard Chiang's private plane¹¹³ and announced that he had a "personal understanding with Assistant Secretary of State [for Occupied Countries] Hilldring that steps would be

taken to establish an independent government in south Korea."¹¹⁴

IX. The Last Round

When the Joint Commission met for the second time in May 1947, the Americans submitted application for 425 organizations which were to be consulted in the American zone about the matter of reunification. The strongest left-wing organizations were omitted from the list, and Soviet suspicions were only further enhanced by the claim that 52 million people, or the total adult population of Korea, belonged to an average of five groups each.¹¹⁵ The Americans, however, wished to present a picture of a South Korea opposed to the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow Agreement and strongly in favor of a separate South Korean state under a rightist regime.

The United States, however, did pay lip service to the idea of a united Korea under trusteeship, the essence of the Moscow Agreement. As a condition for the resumption of talks, the U.S. had agreed that parties and groups which worked against the trusteeship would be barred from participation in a Korean provisional government. No sooner had the first session opened than the State Department's advisor to the American delegation, James K. Penfield, told a meeting of Rhee's Democratic Council that they could denounce the trusteeship when the Korean provisional government was set up, and that they would be able to avoid a trusteeship.¹¹⁶ The Commission was back to where it was the previous May. A continuous barrage of anti-trusteeship activity emanated from Rhee's "National Unification Headquarters," a super pool of twenty-six rightist parties.¹¹⁷

When Syngman Rhee returned from consultations in Washington, he assumed active control of the right. With new outbreaks of rightist activity, including physical assaults upon the Soviet delegates to the Joint Commission meeting in Seoul on July 26, and unable to reach any agreement as the level of suppression of the left increased, the Soviet delegation left in August.¹¹⁸ Rhee had reasoned correctly that the United States, in view of its declaration of war on communism, would not set up a provisional government without including the rightists, whom he was now in a position to deny to them. The United States needed Rhee whether it liked him or not.¹¹⁹

In 1947 blanket instructions to arrest all leftists were secretly issued, and the police force was increased to 25,000. Although there were only 7,000 political prisoners admittedly held by the Military Government,¹²⁰ most of the leftists were arrested on a variety of other charges, such as the illegal distribution of formerly Japanese-owned land to the peasants. By mid-1947 there were almost 22,000 people in jail, nearly twice as many as under the Japanese.¹²¹ Most of the cases that went to trial were tried in the military provost courts of the Military Government.

The procedure and substance of these trials is worth noting in some detail. In U.S. Army provost courts, the judge is also counselor for the defense and prosecuting attorney. Moreover, the question of separate defense counsel was a moot one, since, as one officer explained, "you can't assign one to each defendant. There are too many of them."¹²² As Meade observed:

The provost courts were principally a method of removing

opponents of the military government from circulation. Numerous cases were tried; there were no acquittals. There were virtually no restrictions on a provost court, except for the maximum sentence. No records were kept except bare facts, such as names, offenses, and punishments. Officers appointed as judges rarely had any training or background in law, and seemed to feel that the natives were not entitled to receive American justice. Frequently the court acted as prosecutor as well, and made up its own rules of procedure to meet individual cases. Important cases were decided in advance of the trial by the tactical commander. When Chiandei leaders Kim Suk and Ri To Ku were brought before a provost court, the judge gave them the sentence which the tactical commander had ordered him to pronounce. Kim's trial was one of the greatest travesties of vaunted Anglo-Saxon justice that the writer has ever witnessed. The prosecution presented charges that rested mainly on hearsay and unsupported evidence; the case was so weak that it would have been laughed out of any court in the United States. However, when Kim's counsel moved for the customary period in which to prepare a defense to the charges, the judge curtly denied the motion, and pronounced sentence. In other words, the accused was not permitted to defend himself. Such proceedings mystified and dismayed the Koreans, since they were hardly distinguishable from the most arbitrary of Japanese procedures.¹²³

Kim Won Bong, a non-communist labor leader, alleged to have led an "illegal" strike:

Written speeches were introduced as evidence which presumably he had delivered to a left-wing rally some weeks before and in which a strike was urged. Fortunately for Kim, he was able to produce witnesses to testify that he had made no such statements. . . . He was nevertheless brought to trial. Three "witnesses" were shanghaied off the street. The first witness was called. "Do you recognize this man?" the judge asked. "No, I do not," answered the erstwhile witness. A police sergeant's fist shot out and knocked the man to his knees. Next witness! The process was repeated. . . . Third witness! This poor unfortunate had seen the fate of his two companions, and decided to escape a similar ordeal. Falteringly, he recognized the suspect. A conviction quickly followed. The judge was an American officer.¹²⁴

Roger Baldwin wrote this description in August, 1947:

We hold in prison thousands of men convicted by American provost courts—which are no courts at all, in a legal sense—for "offenses against the occupation." Some such offenses: "Attending, organizing, or acting as an officer at an unauthorized meeting; uttering speech, or words, or singing a song hostile to the United States, the armed forces, or the Military Government; sending a communication detrimental or disrespectful to the United States;—or failing to report its receipt; sending an uncensored message, or a letter outside the mails.

These are provost-court offenses. . . . Penalty for committing them may be five years in jail. Most of the prisoners so held are, ostensibly, leftists. Are they "disrespectful of the United States" when they strike or hold unauthorized meetings? The Seoul press reports that

70 percent of the provost-court prisoners are involved in strike cases.¹²⁵

A few examples of these sentences meted out to leftists are:

April 5th, 1947, two men received two years each for "disturbing the general peace." On the same date, two others received sentences of two and one year for fomenting an "illegal" strike. On November 16th, 1946, two men received six months at hard labor for attending an "unauthorized speech"; three others received similar sentencing for possession of "illegal handbills." On November 7th, 1946, 23 strikers were given sentences ranging from two months to four years each. November 7th, 1946, two years hard labor for "organizing a strike against the Military Government." Another 90 days for an "unauthorized meeting"; another 90 days for "demonstrating against the Military Government." On October 4th, 1946, one year of hard labor for writing against the Military Government.¹²⁶

As for the rightists, there is the example of the gangster Kim Tu-han, a right-wing terrorist, who had mutilated and tortured to death two leftist Youth Association members. In penalty he received a fine of the equivalent of \$200.¹²⁷

The use of torture was an accepted police tactic under the U.S. Military Government authorities. Robinson was nearly court-martialed by General Lerch for having stopped the water torture of a suspected pickpocket by Korean police. He relates one particular incident at the time of the Taegu rebellion in October 1946.

It was suspected that one of the leaders was biding in a particular part of Taegu. Unable to unearth him, the police seized his aged mother. They announced that she would be held and tortured every day until her son gave himself up. Either he chose not to do so or was not alive, for he failed to show up. A few days later the beaten and bloated body of the mother was delivered to her home for burial.¹²⁸

Colonel William Maglin, American Director of the National Police, and Colonel A. S. Champeny, Deputy Military Governor, justified torture treatment as the only thing a Korean understood.¹²⁹

In many areas, the police held the power to withhold permits for public demonstrations and the distribution of papers and pamphlets. Needless to say, few if any permits were issued to leftist groups: when there was a leftist meeting, the police sided with rightist goon squads in attacking them and then arresting their victims.¹³⁰ In addition to their political authority, the police wielded powerful economic authority as the chief administrators of the nationwide grain collection system, determining the quotas to be allocated to each farmer. Accompanying these enormous powers was considerable extortion. While a policeman's official salary was only \$3.00 a month, "voluntary contributions" usually amounted to from fifty to eighty times that amount.¹³¹ In the homes of the policemen killed in the Taegu Rebellion there was found on the average 142 gallons of rice, an amount impossible to have acquired legally. At the very top, Dr. Cough, the National Director of Police, according to U.S. intelligence reports, amassed twenty million yen in his bank account (the equivalent of about U.S. \$200,000).¹³²

In October 1946 General Hodge had advocated building

up a "rightist Youth Army to augment and assist occupation forces and the police and constabulary" to harass and intimidate the left.¹³³ The Military Government organized ganster-like rightist youth bands, such as the Korean National Youth Association of Lee Bum Suk. It secretly provided them with five million dollars and American Army equipment. A training center at Suwom was established under the leadership of Dr. An Ho-sang, an open admirer of Hitler's Youth Corps. Indeed, the methods and the history of the Hitler Jugend was part of the curriculum.¹³⁴ Colonel Ernest Voss of the Internal Security Department of the Military Government was the group's advisor.¹³⁵ By July 1947 some 70,000 youths had received training.¹³⁶

In April 1948 the Military Government authorized the south Korean police to deputize "local patriotic Koreans," called the "Community Protective Association," to help "the police to keep order."¹³⁷ 8,479 people were arrested in connection with the February 7, 1948 strike.¹³⁸ On March 12 General Hodge ordered all radio receiving sets to be licensed and issued laws requiring that a gathering of more than three persons have a police permit. All utterances critical of the Military Government, whether spoken or written, were forbidden.¹³⁹

The United States proceeded with its plan to hold a separate election in the southern zone. Although other political leaders opposed the plan, the exception was Syngman Rhee who would rather have been head of a separate regime than see a united Korea. On "election" day, May 9, 1948, thirty United Nations Commission staff members were assigned to observe an area of forty thousand square miles, where seven million eligible voters resided. To make sure everyone voted, the Military Government assigned the Community Protective Association the task of insuring a turnout.¹⁴⁰

One of the final acts of the Military Government in August 1948 before turning over care of the south Korean police to Syngman Rhee was to order the complete registration of all persons with families in the north, placing penalties of up to ten years for failure to comply.¹⁴¹

The formal transfer of power from the American Military Government to the Rhee regime did not really change the American rule in Korea. According to one American official assigned to Korea:

*Military governors in the provinces were to be called civil affairs officers. The directors of the various national and provincial departments were called advisors. But the name doesn't make the article. In name, a Korean was, for instance, director of education in Kangwon Province, with an American as advisor. Actually, in nine cases out of ten, the advisors ran the show, even to tacking their signatures onto every important document.*¹⁴²

Moreover, Rhee's government continued and intensified the policy of repression, as the following U.N. Commission statistics reveal. In the first eight months of its existence, Rhee's government made 89,710 arrests (from September 4, 1948, to April 30, 1949):

Of those arrested, 28,404 persons were released, 21,606 were turned over to the prosecutor's office for further proceedings, 29,284 were transferred to a "security office," 6,985 were transferred to the military police, and 1,187

*cases were pending.*¹⁴³

Thus the American policy in Korea eerily foreshadows the "vietnamization" strategy of the 1970s. Confronted by a strong popular movement which opposed both a subservient role and the rightist groups which had collaborated with an imperial power, the United States at first tried to use the machinery of Japanese rule for its purpose of establishing a Korea open to American hegemony. Failing in this, it quickly turned to the task of creating an amenable government in Korea and a class, backed by an appropriate police apparatus, which would support such a government. In Korea we have the crude beginnings of an imperial strategy which later became a global system of domination.

NOTES

1. Carl Berger, *The Korea Knot*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia, 1964), 44.
2. Berger, 50.
3. United States Department of State, *The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943*, 449.
4. United States Department of State, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945*, 770. It is ironic that Roosevelt should parallel the fate of Korea with that of the Philippines, for it was his cousin Theodore Roosevelt who in the secret Taft-Katsura agreement (1905) gave the Japanese a free hand in their colonization of Korea in exchange for assurances to the United States of their non-interest in the Philippines.
5. *Ibid.*, and TASS statement of January 25, 1946, cited in *Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1946*, 618.
6. *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945*, 770.
7. Soon-sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics 1940-50* (1967), 24.
8. United States Department of State, *The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, 351-2.
9. *Ibid.*, 632.
10. *Ibid.*, 253.
11. *Ibid.*, 631.
12. *Ibid.*, 225.
13. Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decision* (1955), 434.
14. D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins*, Vol. 1, 1917-50 (Garden City, N.Y., 1960) cites Philip Morrison, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1949, 40.
15. United States Senate, *The United States and the Korean Problem* (1953), 2-3.
16. Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, 444-5; see also Dean Rusk's account in *Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1945*, 1039.
17. Yim, Louise, *My Forty Year Fight for Korea* (New York, 1951), 227.
18. E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (1951), 55.
19. Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York, 1948), 436.
20. Richard D. Robinson, unpublished manuscript. Robinson was Chief of the Public Opinion Section of the Dept. of Information of the Military Government and later was Historian attached to G2, Intelligence Headquarters of the XXIV Corps until his departure from Korea in 1947.
21. Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-51* (London, 1952), 158.
22. Harold R. Isaacs, *No Peace for Asia* (New York, 1947), 94.
23. Kang Han Mu, *The United States Military Government in Korea*, doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Cincinnati, 1970, 46.
24. Isaacs, 94. What was happening in Korea was by no means unusual. In Indonesia Australian and British forces had landed to allow time for Dutch forces to be brought in to crush the new Republic; in China Chiang Kai-shek was directing Japanese troops against the "red bandits"; British units directed Japanese forces in Indochina until French forces arrived to fight the Vietnam's new republic. Japanese troops were strutting around Saigon wearing the armbands of the British Expeditionary Forces. The Western imperialists used the Japanese forces to suppress popular resistance movements until the day they would be able to reclaim their empires from Sumatra to Seoul.

26. Richard E. Lauterbach, *Danger From the East* (New York, 1947), 200.
27. Lauterbach, 203.
28. Yim, 240.
29. Gayn, 353.
30. Meade, 34. See also Robinson, 50-52.
31. George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), 45.
32. Robinson, 53.
33. Cho, 64.
34. A. Wigfall Green, *The Epic of Korea* (Washington, D.C., 1950), 73.
35. Lauterbach, 236.
36. McCune, *Korea Today*, 65.
37. Robinson, 88.
38. Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government: Korea," *Far Eastern Survey*, November 20, 1946, 350.
39. Robinson, 60.
40. McCune, *Korea Today*, fn. 49.
41. *Ibid.*, 49-50.
42. Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, 1968), 128.
43. Edgar S. Kennedy, *Mission to Korea* (London, 1952), 16.
44. Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York, 1954), 188; see also *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1943, 1094.
45. Oliver, 185.
46. Green, 74.
47. Meade, 262, cites Kaufman, "Korea One Year Later," *Voice of Korea*, October 10, 1946.
48. Kang, 78.
49. United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1945, 1091-2.
50. *Ibid.*, 1093.
51. *Ibid.*, 1112.
52. *Ibid.*, 1123.
53. *Ibid.*, 1130-33.
54. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, TASS statement cited, 618.
55. Robinson, 30.
56. *Ibid.*, 31.
57. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 655.
58. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1945, 1077.
59. Robinson interview.
60. Robinson, 89.
61. Lauterbach, 231-32.
63. Robinson, 99.
64. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 687.
65. Gayn, 355.
66. *Ibid.*, 356.
67. McCune, *Korea Today*, 75-76.
68. Meade, 187.
69. *Ibid.*, 186.
70. Gayn, 394.
71. *Ibid.*, 395. See also: *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 762-3.
72. Gayn, 396-8.
73. *Ibid.*, 401.
74. Robinson, 62.
75. Lauterbach, 219.
76. Robinson, 77.
77. *Ibid.*, 78.
78. Lauterbach, 220.
79. Gayn, 414.
80. *Ibid.*, 401.
81. Lauterbach, 222.
82. Robinson, 126.
83. Cited in *ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*, 126-7.
85. Meade, 158.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *Ibid.*, 165.
88. *Ibid.*, 172.
89. *Ibid.*, 165.
90. Henderson, 142-3.
91. Gayn, 391.
92. *Ibid.*, 423.
93. Robinson, 144-5.
94. Green, 79.
95. Cho, 133.
96. Meade, 187.
97. Robinson, 159.
98. *Ibid.*, 161.
99. *Ibid.*, 162.
100. *Ibid.*, 163.
101. Gayn, 349.
102. Robinson, 185.
103. *Ibid.*, 193.
104. *Ibid.*, 185.
105. *Ibid.*, 186.
106. *Ibid.*, 187.
107. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 782.
108. Yim, *op. cit.*
109. Robinson, 188-90. See also: *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 775-9.
110. Robinson, 197.
111. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1947, 609.
112. Cited in Robinson, 206.
113. Oliver, 236.
114. *Ibid.*, 238. See also: *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 647 and 654 for Hilldring's denial and Rhee's rebuttal.
115. Cho, 146-7.
116. Robinson, 245-6.
117. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 654.
118. Robinson, 252.
119. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1947, 645.
120. Robinson, 147.
121. *Ibid.*, 146.
122. Gayn, 413.
123. Meade, 134.
124. Robinson, 154.
125. Roger N. Baldwin, "Blunder in Korea," *Nation*, August 2, 1947, 120.
126. Robinson, 157.
127. *Ibid.*, 156-7.
128. *Ibid.*, 155.
129. *Ibid.*, 156.
130. *Ibid.*, 148.
131. *Ibid.*, 148-9.
132. *Ibid.*, 151.
133. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* 1946, 751.
134. Robinson, 249.
135. Gayn, 436.
136. Robinson, 249.
137. *Korean Independence*, April 28, 1948.
138. *Korean Independence*, March 31, 1948.
139. *Ibid.*
140. Choy Bong-yaun, *Korea, A History* (Tokyo, 1971), 243.
141. *Korean Independence*, June 9, 1948.
142. John C. Caldwell, *The Korea Story* (1952), 19.
143. John Kie-chiang Oh, *Korea: Democracy on Trial* (1968), 28.

