Philosophical Fragments(원문, 영문)
by Bernhard Riemann
Introduction to the Second German Edition
The philosophical speculations whose results-in so far as
they can be assembled from his literary remains-are here
communicated, concerned Riemann throughout the greater
part of his life.
Anything definite concerning the time at which
these individual fragments were written can hardly be determined.
The drafts here are far from being coherent essays ready
for publication, even if many passages indicate that Riemann
had at certain times intended such a publication; they suffice,
in any case, to characterize Riemann's orientation to questions
of psychology and naturalphilosophy in general and to indicate
the course taken by his investigations; unfortunately, however,
almost every exposition is lacking in detail. The value that
Riemann himself placed on these labors can be seen from the
following note:
"The tasks that principally concern me now are:
"1. To introduce the imaginary into the theory of other
transcendental functions, in a manner similar to the way this has
already been done with such great success for algebraic functions,
the exponential and cyclical functions, and the elliptical
and Abelian functions. To that end, I have supplied the most
necessary general preparations in my inaugural dissertation.
(See article 20 of this dissertation.)
"2. In connection with this, new methods exist for integration
of partial differential equations, which I have already applied
to several physical subjects with success.
"3. My principal task concerns a new conception of known
natural laws-the expression of these laws by means of other
fundamental concepts-through which it becomes possible to
use experimental data on the interaction of heat, light,
magnetism, and electricity in order to investigate their relations.
I was led to this principally through the study of Newton's, Euler's, and -on the other hand- Herbart's works. Concerning
the latter, I could concur almost completely with Herbart's
earliest investigations, whose results are expressed in his graduation and
habilitation theses (of Oct. 22 and 23, 1802), but I
had to diverge from the later course of his speculation on an
essential point. I differ with him in regard to natural philosophy
and those propositions in psychology which concern their connection to
natural philosophy."
Further along, in another place, we find a more exact description of
this standpoint:
"The author is a Herbartian in psychology and epistemology(methodology and the theory of perception); he cannot, however,
for the most part, agree with Herbart's natural philosophy
and the related disciplines(ontology and the study of continua)."
The three fragments unified under the common title "III.
Natural Philosophy" have been rearranged in this second edition.
Number 2 of the first edition has been exchanged with
number 3. According to a conjecture of Dr. Isenkrahe in Bonn
which is well supported by internal evidence, it is the essay
titled "Gravitation and Light " which is referred to in the passage
of Riemann's letter of Dec. 28, 1853*, that is cited in the biographical
sketch[pp. 539-558 of his Collected Works], according to which
Riemann had in view a publication of these investigations.
The essay, "New Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy, " with the observation, "Discovered on March 1,
1853," which is concerned with an entirely different set of
ideas, is therefore of an earlier origin, and the bold hypothesis
expressed in that essay of the disappearance of matter was not
futher pursued by Riemann.
-Heinrich Weber (1892)
*p 547
December 28, 1853: "My work is now pretty much in order. I submitted my habilitation thesis at the beginning of December and had to suggest three topics for a trial lecture, from which the faculty would then choose one. I had the first two ready and hoped that one of them would be chosen; But Gauss chose the third, and so I am now in a bit of a bind again, as I still have to work this out. I resumed my other investigation into the connection between electricity, galvanism, light and gravity immediately after finishing my habilitation thesis and have got so far with it that I can publish it in this form without any problems. At the same time, however, I have become more and more certain that Gauss has also been working on it for several years and has shared the matter with some friends, including Weber, under the seal of secrecy - I can write this without it being interpreted as presumptuousness - I hope that it is not too late for me now and that it will be recognized that I discovered the matter completely independently."
Translator's Note(see below)
This is the first English translation of various sketches left by
Riemann at his death in 1866. They were compiled under the title
'Fragmente philosophischen Inhalts'(Philosophical Fragments), and
first appeared in the 1876 first edition of 'Bemhard Riemann's Gesam
melte Mathematische Werke und Wissenschaftlicher Nachlass'(Bern
hard Riemann's Collected Mathematical Works and Scientific Remains),
published by B.G. Teubner. The volume was edited by Heinrich Weber, who later compiled and published partial differential
equations in mathematical physics from Riemann's Lectures.
Teubner published a more complete second edition of Riemann's
collected works in 1892, also prepared by Weber, and a supplement
of additional materials(Nachtrage) appeared separately in 1902,
edited by M. Noether and W. Wirtinger. These two volumes were
later reprinted by various publishers as one. Dover Publications(New
York) issued such a reprint in 1953, with the title 'The Collected Works
of Bernhard Riemann', although the only English content was a brief
new introduction by Hans Lewy on Riemann's career and thought.
In the German edition of the fragments translated here,
the individual pieces are apparently separated by the short, centered rules that
have been carried over in this translation. All emphases and ellipses
are in the original. Words or phrases in square brackets have been
supplied by the translator. Riemann's own footnotes are indicated
by asterisks and daggers, while the translator's notes are numbered
and appear at the end.
The translation owes its inspiration to Lyndon H. LaRouche, and
was done under the supervision of Carol White. Thanks go to William
F. Wertz, Jr. and Renee Sigerson for their abundant help.
David Cherry, Winter 1995-1996
I. On Psychology and Metaphysics
Do not scornfully reject the gifts I have devotedly
marshalled for you, before you have understood them
- Lucretius
With each simple act of thinking, something durable, sub
stantial, enters our mind. This substance appears to us,
in fact, as a unity, but it appears (insofar as it is the expression
of space and time extension) as comprising a subsumed mani
fold; I name this a "thought mass"! To this effect, all thinking
is the development of new thought masses.
The thought masses entering into the mind appear to us to
be images; their varying internal states determine how they
differ qualitatively.
As they are forming, the thought masses blend; or are folded
together, or connect to one another and also to older thought
masses, in a precisely determined manner. The character and
strength of these connections depend upon causes which were
only partially recognized by Herbart, but which I shall fill out
in what follows. They rest primarily on the internal relationships
among the thought masses.
The mind is a compact, multiply connected thought mass
with internal connections of the most intimate kind. It grows
continuously as new thought masses enter it, and this is the
means by which it continues to develop.
Thought masses once formed, are imperishable; and their
connections can not be dissolved; only the relative strength of
these connections is altered by the addition of new thought masses.
Thought masses need no material carrier for their continued
existence, and exert no lasting effect upon the physical world.
Therefore they are not related to any portion of matter, and
have no position in space.
On the other hand, a material carrier is required for every
entry, generation, every formation of new thought masses, and
for their unification. Thus all thinking does occur at a definite place.
(It is not the retention of our experience but only thinking,
which is strenuous; and this exertion of effort, in so far as we
can estimate it, is proportional to the mental activity.)
Every thought mass which enters the mind,
stimulates all thought mass to which it is related, and does so the more
strongly the less the dissimilarity between the internal states(quality).
This stimulation is not confined, however, merely to related
thought masses, but also extends, through mediation, to those
that are linked with them (that is, connected by previous
thought processes). Thus if among the related thought masses,
a portion is linked, these will be stimulated not merely directly
but also through mediation, and therefore will be stimulated
proportionally more strongly than the rest.
The interaction of two thought masses being formed
at the same time, is conditioned by a material process between
the places where they are both being formed. Likewise, for
material reasons, all thought masses being formed enter into
unmediated interaction with those formed immediately before;
however, through mediation, all older thought masses linked
to these will also be stimulated into activity, although to a
weaker degree according to the diminished amount and increased
distance of their connections.
The most general and simplest expression of the effectiveness
of older thought masses is in their reproduction, which occurs
when an active thought mass strives to reproduce one similar
to itself.
The formation of new thought masses is based partly on the
combined effect of older thought masses, partly on material
causes; and these, working together, are retarded or advanced
according to the internal dissimilarity or similarity of the thought
masses whose reproduction is sought.
The form of the developing thought mass (or the quality of
the image which a companies its formation) depends upon the
relative form of the motion! of the matter in which it is shaped,
so that a given form of motion of the matter, causes a like form
of the thought mass shaped within it; and conversely, whatever
the form of the thought mass, it presupposes a like form of
motion of the matter in which it is shaped.
All thought masses simultaneously being formed (in our
cerebro-spinal system) are connected in consequence of a
physical (chemical-electrical) process between the sites where
they are formed.
Each thought mass strives to reproduce a thought mass of
like form. It therefore tries to recreate the form of motion of
the matter in which it is formed.
The assumption of mind as a unified carrier for that which is enduring-produced by individual acts of mental life (images)-is based upon the following:
1. On the close connection and mutual interpenetration of
all images. In order to explain the linking of a particular new
image with others, it is however, not sufficient to simply assume
a unified carrier; rather the cause as to why the given image
enters into just such particular connections, with just such
particular strengths, must be sought in the images to which it
binds itself. Once these causes are given, however, it then
becomes superfluous to make the assumption of a unified carrier for all of
the images ... .
Let us now apply these laws of mental processes, to which
the explanation of our own inner perception leads, to explain
what we perceive to be purposefulness on earth, i.e., to an
explanation of existence and historical development.
Herbart on the thought process
Johann Friedrich Herbart, German philosopher and educational theorist, was the dominant influence on American education in the 1890' until his classical theory was attacked by radical empricist John Dewey in 1896.
The following passage from his seminal work, Outlines of Educational Doctrine(translated by Alexis F. Lange, New York, Macmillan, 1911) is typical of those upon which Riemann drew in formulating his theory of the process of creative discovery in terms of an elaboration of successively higher-dimensional, multiply connected manifolds.
Herbart write(page 19);
Each body of ideas is made up of complications of ideas, which, if the union is perfect, come and go in consciousness as undivided wholes, and of series, together with their interlacings, whose members unfoled successively, one by one, provided they are not checked. The closer the union of parts within these complications and series, the more absolute the laws according to which ideas act in consciousness, the stronger is the resistance against everything opposing their movement; hence the difficulty of acting upon them thorugh instruction.
They admit, however, of additions and recommbinations, and so may in the course of time undergo essential changes; up to a certain point they even change of themselves if repeatly called into consciousness by dissimilar occasions, e.g., by the frequent delivery of the same lecture before different audiences.
- David Cherry
|
For the explanation of our mental life, it was necessary to
assume that the thought masses which were produced in our
nervous system endure as part of our mind; that their internal
relations persist without alteration, and that they are subjected
to alteration only in so far as they enter into connection with
other thought masses.
It is a direct consequence of these principles of explanation,
that the minds of organic beings-i.e., the compact thought
masses arising during their lives-also continue to exist after
their death. (Their isolated continuance is not sufficient.) In
order to explain the systematic development of organic nature,
however-in which previously gathered experiences obviously
serve as the foundation for subsequent creations-we must
assume that these thought masses enter into a greater compact
thought mass, the biosphere, and there serve a
higher mental life, according to the same laws as those which operate when
we reproduce thought masses in our nervous system to serve
our own mental life.
Take as an example, the case in which we see a red surface.
The thought masses produced in an aggregate of individual
primitive fiber is bound into a single, compact, thought mass,
which enters into our thinking at once. In the same way, the
thought masses produced in various individuals of a species
of plant, which enter the biosphere from a region of the earth's
surface which is not very diverse climatically, will be combined
into a single impression. Just as various sense perceptions of
the same object are united in our mind into one image of the
object, so all plants of one part of the earth's surface will give
the biosphere a picture, worked out in the finest detail, of its
climatic and chemical condition. In this manner, the way in
which the plan for later creations evolved from the earlier life
of the earth, can be explained.
But, according to our principles of explanation, the continued
existence of thought masses once present, requires no
material carrier; yet all of the interconnections, at least every
connection between thought masses of different kinds, can only
occur by means of the production of newer thought masses
by a common process of the nervous system(참조: 물 어는 과정).
For reasons to be developed later, we can seek the carrier
for a mental activity only in measurable matter.
Now it is a fact, that the rigid crust of the earth, along with
everything measurable above it, does not serve a common
'mental' process; we can only explain the movement of these
measurable substances by other causes.
Accordingly, the only remaining assumption is that the measurable
masses within the rigid crust of the earth are the carrier
for the mental life of the earth.
Are these masses suitable for this purpose? What are the
external conditions necessary for the life process? We can establish
the foundation for an answer only empirically, on the basis
of the living processes that are accessible to our observation;
but only insofar as we succeed in explaining them, can we
draw conclusions from them which are also applicable to other
classes of phenomena.
Empirically, the external conditions of living processes in
the range of phenomena accessible to us are:
1. The higher and more completely developed the life process, the more it is necessary to protect its carrier from
external causes of motion which strive to change the relative
position of its parts.
2. The physical processes (changes in matter) known to us
that serve as a means for the thought process:
(a) absorption of gas by liquids
(b) osmosis inward through a cell wall
(c) formation and decomposition of chemical compounds
(d) Galvanic currents.
3. The substance of organisms has no recognizable crystalline
structure; it is partly solid (only slightly brittle), partly gelatinous,
partly liquid or gaseous, but always porous, that is, markedly
penetrable by gases.
4. Among all chemical elements, only the four so-called
organic elements are general carriers for the life process, and
again, quite definite compounds of these, the so-called organizing
compounds, are components of organic bodies (protein, cellulose, etc.).
5. Organic compounds exist only to a definite upper temperature
limit, and can be carriers of life only to a definite lower one.
ad. 1. Changes in the relative position of the parts of a body
are caused by the following (in decreasing stepwise order of
their effect): mechanical forces, changes in temperature, light
radiation; accordingly, we can order the facts-of which our
proposition is the general expression-as follows:
1. The propagation of lower organisms through division. The
gradually decreasing reproductive capacity of higher animal organisms.
2. The parts of plants are the more sensitive to changes in
temperature, the more intensive and the more highly developed
the life process is in them. In the higher animal organisms, an
almost constant temperature governs, especially in their most
vital parts.
3. The parts of the nervous system which serve independent
thinking are protected against all these influences as much as possible.
Obviously, the foundation for the fact
first presented is that,
the more the relative position of the parts can be determined
by processes occurring within the interior of the matter, the
less will it be determined by external motion. This independence
from external sources of motion, however, occurs to a
far higher degree inside the crust of the earth, than for organic
beings on the outside.
In the context of the following facts, taken together, those
placed under 4. and 5. [labove] are apparently contrary to our
assumption; they would be so, in fact, if absolute validity were
to be ascribed to those conditions perceived by us for the
possibility of a life process, rather than a merely relative validity
within the limits of our experience. The following reasons go
against their absolute validity, however:
1. All of nature, with the exception of the surface of the
earth, would then have to be considered dead, since on all
other celestial bodies, temperature and pressure relations predominate
under which organic compounds cannot exist.
2. It is absurd to assume that the organic arose from the
inorganic on the rigid crust of the earth. In order to explain
the origin of the lowest organisms on the earth's crust, some
organizing principle must be assumed, and thus a
thought processs must exist under
conditions in which organic compounds could not exist.
We must therefore assume that these conditions are valid
only for the life process under the present relationships on the
surface of the earth, and only in so far as we are successful in
explaining these, can we judge from them the possibility of
the life process governed by different relationships.
Why, therefore, are only the four organic elements universal
carriers of the life process? The reason can only be sought in
properties by which these four elements are distinguished from
all others.
1. One such general property of these four elements consists
in the fact that they and their compounds are the most difficult
to condense of all materials, and, some of them have not yet
been condensed at all.
2. Another property which they share is the great multiplicity
of their compounds and the ease with which they decompose.
This property, however, could just as well be the consequence
of their use in living processes as its cause.
However, the former property, that of being difficult to condense,
is what makes these four elements preeminently suited
to serve life processes. To a certain extent this is directly explainable
from the conditions of the life process enumerated
under 2. and 3., but even more if we attempt to
trace the
phenomena found in the condensation of gases to liquids and
solids, back to their causes. . . .
Zend-Avesta is in fact a life-giving word(주: *Compare Fechner, Zend-Avesta, Vol. 1. Preface, page V), which creates new
life for our mind, in knowledge as in faith. For like many a
thought, which indeed was at one time powerfully effective in
the course of development of mankind, but is now only preserved
for us through tradition, Zend-Avesta arises now, all at
once, from its apparent death, into a purer form of new life,
and reveals new life in nature. Now as the life of nature
previously only manifest on the surface of the earth-is immeasurably
extended before our eyes, it appears inexpressibly more
sublime. What we considered as the seat of forces working
senselessly and unconsciously, now appears as the workplace
of the highest spiritual activity. What our great poet has portrayed
with prescient inspiration as the goal, which hovered
before the mind of the investigator, is now fulfilled in a wondrous way.
Gustav Fechner(1801-1887) was an experimental psychologist and professor of physics at the University of Leipzig from 1834 until 1839, when he resigned because of illness. His work, however, continues to be very wide-ranging after his subsequent recovery. He is remembered today chiefly in connection whtih Fechner's(or Weber's) law that stimuli are perpceived by the mind whith logarithmic compression: The intensity of a sensation increases arithmetically if the intensity of the stimulus increases geometrically. |
Just as Fechner in his Nanna seeks to
demonstrate that plants
possess the characteristics of mind, so the starting point of his considerations in Zend-Avesta is the doctrine of the soulfulness of the stars. His method is not to abstract general
laws through induction in order to apply and confirm these in
the explanation of nature, but rather to reason by analogy. He
compares the earth to our own organism, which we know
has a mind. He does not merely one-sidedly investigate the
similarities, but also does as much justice to the dissimilarities.
In this way he obtains the result that all the similarities indicate
that the earth is a being possessing characteristics of a mind,
and that all of the dissimilarities indicate that it is a being with
a mind of a far higher order than our own. The persuasive
power of this presentation lies in its many-sided, detailed exposition.
The total impression of the picture unfurled for us, of
the life of the earth, provides evidence for his view, and compensates
for that which the individual conclusions lack in rigor.
This evidence rests on the intuitive clarity of the image, and
on its execution in the greatest possible detail. I would therefore
believe myself to be doing harm to Fechner's view, were I to
attempt to present here, in outline, the course he takes in his
works. In the following discussion of Fechner's views, I will
ignore the form in which they are presented, and consider only
the substance, and thus take as a basis the former method, the
abstraction of general laws by induction and their confirmation
in the explanation of nature.
Let us ask first: From what do we conclude that something
has a mind (the occurrence within it of a continuing, unified
thinking process)? We are directly aware of our own mind,
and with others (human beings and animals), we infer it from
individual purposeful movements.
In general, wherever we trace a well-ordered purposefulness
back to a cause, we seek this cause in a process of thought;
we do not have another explanation. Thinking itself, however,
I can only consider as a process which occurs within the interior
of measurable matter. As is evident to anyone who tries to
analyze inner perception impartially, it is impossible to explain
thinking on the basis of the motion of matter in space; however,
the abstract possibility of such an explanation may be conceded here.
No one will deny that purposefulness is perceived on the
earth. And so the question arises: Where are we to locate the
thought process that is the cause of this purposefulness?
The concern here is only with conditioned purposes (those
which take place within limited time and space); unconditional
purposes find their explanation in an eternal Will (not produced
in a process of thought). The only purposefulness whose cause
we perceive is that of our own actions. It originates in willing
the end and reflecting upon means.
If we find a body consisting of measurable matter in which
a lattice of continuing, related purposes and actions are completely realized,
we can explain this purposefulness by means
of a continuing, unified thought process, and this hypothesis
will be the most probable if (1) the purposefulness is not com
pleted merely in parts of the body and (2) no reason is present
to seek the cause of that purposefulness in a larger whole of
which the body is a part.
If we apply this to the purposefulness which we perceive in
human beings, animals, and plants, then it follows that a part
of this purposefulness is to be explained by a thought process
which occurs within these bodies; another part, however, the
purposefulness of the organism itself, is to be explained by a
process of thinking in a larger whole.
The reasons for this are:
1. The purposefulness of organisms does not find completion
in individual organisms. The reasons for the constitution of the
human organism are obviously to be sought in the constitution
of the entire surface of the earth, with organic nature taken
into account.
2. The organism's activities repeat themselves innumerable
times, in part simultaneously in different individuals, partly
successively in the life of an individual or a generation. For
the purposefulness which lies in them already per se, we need
not assume a special cause in each case, but rather a common cause.
3. In the case of human beings and animals, their constitutions
undergo no further development within the lifetime of
the single individual, nor (in the case of plants and embryos)
within the life of a single generation. Therefore, the cause of
their purposefulness is not to be sought in a simultaneously
continuing process of thought.
Apart from these aspects of (organic) purposefulness, there
is still in man and animals, by common consent-and in plants
in Fechner's view-a closed lattice of interpenetrating and variable
relations of purpose and action; and this purposefulness
is explained by the existence of a unified "thought process"
within them.
These conclusions which we draw from our principles are
confirmed through our inner perception.
According to the same principles, however, we must look
for the reason behind the purposefulness which we perceive
in organisms in a unified thought process occurring in the earth,
on the following grounds:
(a) The relationships of purpose and action characteristic of
organic life on earth cannot be separated into separate systems;
on the contrary, everything is interlocked. They cannot therefore be explained
as several particular thought processes, in
various parts of the earth.
(b) There is no basis, as far as our experience goes, for
seeking the reason for this purposefulness in a greater whole.
All organisms are determined only for life on the earth. The
condition of the earth's crust contains, therefore, all the (external)
reasons needed to explain how they are organized.
(c) Organisms found on earth are individual. According to
everything that experience teaches, we must assume that they
are not replicated on other celestial bodies.
(d) They do not persist throughout the life of the earth.
Instead, new, more perfect organisms are always appearing. We
must therefore seek the cause in a thought process that is
simultaneously ascending to higher levels.
The assumption of a biosphere is therefore a hypothesis for
explaining the existence and the historical development of the
organic world, from the standpoint of exact natural science,
of a natural explanation from causes.
"When the body of the lower soul dies," Fechner says, "the
higher soul takes it up from its perceptual life into its life of
memory." The souls of deceased creatures are thus said to form
the elements for the soul-life of the earth.
The various processes of thought seem to be principally
distinguished by their temporal rhythm. If plants possess minds,
so must hours and days be for them, what seconds are for us;
the corresponding period of time for the earth mind encompasses
many millennia, at least, for its outward activity. As far
as the historical memory of mankind reaches, all movements
of the inorganic crust of the earth are probably to be explained
by mechanical laws.
Antinomies
| Thesis
Finite, imaginable
| Antithesis
Infinite, conceptual systems,
those on the border of imaginable |
I | Finite time and space
elements | The continuous |
II | Freedom, i.e. not the ability to start absolutely,
but rather to decide between two or more given possibilities
So that decision through choice be possible, despite the existence of fully
determinate laws of the working of images, one must assume
that the psychic mechanism itselt has, or at least takes on, in its
development, the characteristic of leading to the neccessity of decision
through choice.
| Determinism
No one, when acting, can give up the conviction thate the the future
is partly determined by his action.
is co-determined |
III | God who operates in time(governance of the universe)
| A timeless, personal,
omniscient, omnipotent, all-good God(providence) |
IV |
Immortality
Freedom is entirely compatible with strict lawfulness of the course of nature. But the concept of a timeless God is not tenable beside it.
Rather, the limitation which omnipotence
and omniscience must suffer through the
freedom of the creatures in the sense established, is removed through the assumption of a God operating in time, who is.
|
A thing in itself, which is the basis of our transient existence, endowed with transcendental freedom, radicl evil, intelligible character |
General Relationship between the Conceptual
Systems of Thesis and Antithesis
The method, which Newton used for founding the infinitesimal calculus,
and which, since the beginning of this century,
has been acknowledged by the best mathematicians as the
only one which produces reliable results, is the method of
limits. The method consists in this, that instead of considering a
continuous transition from one value of a magnitude to another,
from one position to another, or in general, from one mode of
determination of a concept to another, one first considers a
transition through a finite number of intermediate steps, and
then allows the number of these intermediate steps to grow,
so that the distance between two consecutive intermediate
steps decreases ad infinitum.
Conceptual systems of antithesis are concepts indeed firmly
determined through negative predicates, but not positively resentable.
Just because an exact and complete representation of these
conceptual systems is impossible, they are not accessible to
direct investigation and treatment by our reflection. But they
can be considered to lie at the boundary of the representable,
i.e., one can form a conceptual system which lies within the
representable, but which passes over into the given conceptual
system through mere changes in the relative magnitudes. Apart
from the relative magnitudes, the conceptual system remains
unchanged in the transition to the limit. In the limiting case
itself, however, some of the correlative concepts of the system
lose their representability, in fact precisely those which mediate
the relationship with other concepts.
II. Epistemological Issues
Attempt at a Theory of the fundamental
Concepts of Mathematics and Physics as the
foundation for the Explanation of Nature
Natural science is the attempt to understand nature by means
of exact concepts.
According to the concepts through which we comprehend
nature, our perceptions are supplemented and filled in, not
simply at each moment, but also future perceptions are seen
as necessary. Or, to the degree that the conceptual system is
not fully sufficient, future perceptions are determined beforehand
as probable; according to the concepts, what is "possible"
is determined (thus also what is "necessary," and conversely,
impossible). And the degree of possibility (of "probability") of
each individual event which is seen as possible, in light of
these concepts, can be mathematically determined, if the concepts
are precise enough.
To the extent that what is necessary or probable, according
to these concepts, takes place, then this confirms the concepts,
and the trust that we place in these concepts rests on this
confirmation through experience. But if something takes place
that is unexpected according our existing assumptions, i.e.,
that is impossible or improbable according to them, then the
task arises of completing them or, if necessary, reworking the
axioms, so that what is perceived ceases to be impossible or
improbable. The completion or improvement of the conceptual
system forms the 'explanation' of the unexpected perception.
Our comprehension of nature gradually becomes more and
more complete and correct through this process, simultaneously
penetrating more and more behind the surface of appearances.
The history of causal natural science, in so far as we can
trace it back, shows that this is, in fact, the way our knowledge
of nature advances. The conceptual systems that are now the
basis for the natural sciences, arose through a gradual transformation
of older conceptual systems, and the reasons that drove
us to new modes of explanation can always be traced back to
contradictions and improbabilities that emerged from the older
modes of explanation.
The formation of new concepts, in so far as this process is
accessible to observation, therefore takes place in this way.
Herbart furnished the proof that concepts that allow us to
comprehend the world-those whose origin we can trace neither in history
nor in our own development, because they
are delivered to us unnoticed through our language-can be
derived from this source, in so far as they are more than mere
forms combining simple sense images; and therefore these concepts need
not be derived from some special constitution of
the human mind which precedes all experience (such as
Kant's categories).
This proof of their origin in our ability to comprehend that
which is given to us by sense perception, is important for
us, because it is only in this way that their meaning can be
determined in a manner satisfactory for science... .
After the concept of things existing in
themselves has been
formed, then in reflecting on the process of change, which
contradicts the concept of things existing in themselves, the
task arises of maintaining this already proven concept as far
as possible. From this problem arise simultaneously the concepts of
continuous change and causality.
All that is observed is the transition of a thing from one state
into another, or, to speak more generally, from one mode
of determination to another, without a sudden jump being
perceived in the transition. In order to complete the observations,
we can either assume that the transition occurs through
a very great, but finite, number of leaps imperceptible our
senses, or that the thing goes continuously through all of the
intermediate steps, taking it from one state to the other. The
strongest reason for the latter conception is the demand to
maintain as far as possible, the already proven concept of the
existence of the thing in itself. Of course, it is not possible to
actually represent such a transition through all intermediate
steps, which, however, as noted, is valid, strictly speaking, for
all concepts.
At the same time, however, according to the concept of the
thing in itself, formed earlier and proven by experience, the
thing would remain what it is, unless something else intervened.
This creates the impulse to seek a cause for every change.
I. When is our comprehension of the world true?
"When the relations among our conceptions correspond to
the relations of things."
The elements of our picture of the world are completely
distinct from the corresponding elements of the reality which
they picture. They are something within us; the elements of
reality are something outside of ourselves. But the connections
among the elements in the picture, and among the elements
of reality which they depict, must agree, if the picture is to
be true.
The truth of the picture is independent of its degree of fineness;
it does not depend upon whether the elements of the
picture represent larger or smaller aggregates of reality. But,
the connections must correspond to one another; a direct action
of two elements upon each other may not be assumed in the
picture, where only an indirect one occurs in reality. Otherwise
the picture would be false and would need correction. If, however, an
element of the picture is replaced by a group of finer
elements, so that its properties emerge, partly from the simpler
properties of the finer elements, but partly from their connections, and thus
become in part comprehensible, then this increases our insight into
the connection of things, but without
the earlier understanding having to be declared false.
II. How do we find the relations among things?
"From the connections of phenomena"
The representation in determinate space-and-time relations
of things of the senses is something met with in deliberate
reflection on nature or is given in that reflection. However, as
we well know, the quality of the characteristics of things of
the senses, color, sound,
tone, smell, taste, heat or cold,
is something merely derived from our own sensations and does not exist
outside of ourselves.
The relations among things must therefore become known
to us from quantitative relations, the
spatial and temporal relations
of things of the senses and the relative intensities of their
characteristics and their qualitative differences.
Knowledge of the connections among things must arise from
reflection on the observed relations of these relations of magnitudes.
Causality
I. What an action strives to accomplish must be determined
through the concept of the action; its acting cannot be dependent upon
anything else than the action's own being.
II. This demand is satisfied when the action strives to maintain
or restore itself.
III. Such an action is not conceivable, if the action
is a thing, a being; but only if it is a state or a relationship.
If a striving exists, to maintain or restore something,
then deviations
from this something must also be possible - and indeed in
different degrees. And in so far as this striving conflicts with
other strivings, it will in fact be maintained or restored only to
the extent possible. But there is no gradation of being; a difference of
degrees is conceivable only for states or relationships.
If therefore, an action strives to maintain or restore itself, it
must be a state or a relationship.
IV. Obviously, such action can only occur in those things
that can assume such a state. But in which of these things it
occurs, and whether it occurs in them at all cannot be determined from
the concept of the action.
주 : These are valid only if the effect is to be ascribed to a simple real cause.
If two things a and b are connected through an external cause, then a
consequence c can be ascribed either to the connection, the process of being
connected itself, or else to a change in the degree of the connection. The
simplest assumption is that the consequence c can be ascribed to
the process
of being connected.
It is unnecessary to to take these considerations further. Their principle
consists in holding to the thesis: "What an action strives to effect must be
determined from the concept of the action"; but this thesis must be applied,
not as Leibniz or Spinoza did, to beings with a manifold of determinations,
but ralher to real causes of the greatest possible simplicity.
In German, one tends to translate 'actio' as well as 'effectus' by "Wirkung
[effect]." Since the word occurs in the latter sense more commonly, unclarity
easily arises if it is used for 'actio', as, for example,
with the standard translation of "actio aequalis est reactioni [action and reaction are equal]," or "principium
actionis minimae [principle of least action]." Kant seeks to remedy this
by adding the Latin expressions 'actio' and "actio mutua" In parenthesis to
"Wirkung" and "Wechselwlrkung [interaction]." One could perhaps write, "die
Kraft is gleich der Gegenkraft [the force is equal to the opposing force],"
"Satz vom kleinsten Kraftaufwande [the principle of least expenditure of force]."
Since, in fact, we lack a simple expression for 'agere', a striving directed
toward something else, I may be permitted the use of the foreign word[agens, action].
Kant quite rightly note that we can neither discover the
existence of a thing, nor that it is the cause of something else,
merely from analysis of the concept of the thing; so that the
concept of being and causality cannot be derived from analysis
but only from experience. When, however, he later believes
himself compelled to assume that the concept of causality
precedes all experience, this is tantamount to throwing the
baby out with the bath; because this implies that the mind
would be preconditioned to accept any perception, given by
experience, as a cause, if it could be connected to any other
arbitrary one as effect, according to a rule of mere sequence.
(Of course, we must derive the relationships of causality from
experience, but we must not dispense with correcting and
completing our comprehension of the data of experience
through reflection.)
The word hypothesis now has a somewhat different meaning
than with Newton. We are now accustomed to understand by
hypothesis all that is added by thought to phenomena.
Newton was far from the absurd thought that the explanation
of phenomena could be gained by abstraction from experience.
Newton: [In Latin from the General Scholium of Principia
Mathematica] "And thus much concerning God; to discourse
of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong
to natural philosophy. [ ... ] But hitherto I have not been able
to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses. "
Arago, Oeuvres Completes, Vol. 3, 505:
[In French] "Once and once only did Laplace rise into the
realm of conjecture. His conception at that time was nothing
less than a cosmogony. "
Laplace in response to Napoleon' question, why the name
God did not occur in his Celestial Mechanics: [in French] "Sire,
I have no need for that hypothesis. "
The distinction that Newton makes between laws of motion,
or axioms, and hypotheses, does not seem tenable to me. The
law of inertia is the hypothesis: If a material point were present
alone in the world and moved in space with a definite velocity,
then it would constantly maintain this velocity.
III. Natural Philosophy
1. Molecular Mechanics
The free movement of a system of material points $m_1, m_2$ ... with rectangular coordinates $x_1, y_1; x_2, y_2, z_2$; ..., on
which forces $X_1, Y_1, Z_1; X_2, Y_2, Z_2$; ... act in parallel to the
three axes, takes place according to the equations
(1) $m_i \frac{d^2x_i}{d t^2}=X_i, \,m_i \frac{d^2y_i}{d t^2}=Y_i,\, m_i \frac{d^2z_i}{d t^2}=Z_i,$
This law can also be expressed as follows: The accelerations
are so determined that
$\sum m_i((\frac{d^2x_i}{d t^2} - \frac{X_i}{m_i})^2+(\frac{d^2y_i}{d t^2} - \frac{Y_i}{m_i})^2+(\frac{d^2z_i}{d t^2} - \frac{Z_i}{m_i})^2)$
becomes a minimum; for this function of the accelerations
takes its smallest value 0 if the accelerations collectively are
determined in accordance with equation (1), that is, the magnitudes
$\frac{d^2 x_i}{dt^2}- \frac{X_i}{m_i}$ ... collectively = 0, and they also take the minimum value only then; for, were one of these magnitudes,
for example, $\frac{d^2 x_i}{dt^2}- \frac{X_i}{m_i}$ not equal to $0$, then $\frac{d^2 x_i}{dt^2}$ could continuously change so that the absolute value of this magnitude
and consequently its square would decrease. The function
would thus become smaller if all the other accelerations were
simultaneously left unchanged.
This function of the accelerations is distinguished from
$\sum m_i((\frac{d^2x_i}{d t^2})^2+(\frac{d^2y_i}{d t^2})^2+(\frac{d^2z_i}{d t^2})^2)-2 \sum (X_i\frac{d^2x_i}{d t^2} +Y_i\frac{d^2y_i}{d t^2}+Z_i\frac{d^2z_i}{d t^2})$
only by a constant, that is, by a magnitude independent of the accelerations.
If the forces between points result only from attraction and
repulsion, which are functions of distance, and the $i$th point
and the $i'$th point at a distance $r$ repulse one another with a
force $f_{i, i'}(r)$ or attract one another with the force -$f_{i, i'}(r)$ then, as is known, the components of the forces can be expressed
through the partial derivatives of a function of the coordinates
of all the points
$P=\sum_{i, i'} F_{i, i'}(r_{i, i'})$,
where $F_{i, i'}(r)$ is a function with derivative $f_{i, i'}(r)$, and for $i$ and $i'$
two different indices are set for each.
If these values of the components
$X_i=\frac{\partial P}{\partial x},
\,Y_i=\frac{\partial P}{\partial y},\, Z_i=\frac{\partial P}{\partial z}$
are substituted into the above function of the accelerations and
are multiplied by $\frac{dt^2}{4}$, through which the positions of their maxima
and minima are not changed, then we obtain an expression
which is distinguished from
$\frac14 \sum((d \frac{dx_i}{dt})^2+(d \frac{dy_i}{dt})^2+
(d \frac{dz_i}{dt})^2) -P_{(t+dt)}$
only by a magnitude which is independent of the accelerations.
If the position and the velocities of the points at time $t$ are
given, then this position is determined at time $t + dt$ such that
this magnitude becomes as small as possible. Accordingly,
there is a striving for this magnitude to become a minimum.
This law can be explained on the basis of actions which
strive to make the individual terms of this expression as small
as possible if we assume that the strivings working against one
another are so equalized that the sum of the magnitudes which
the individual actions strive to maintain at a minimum,
becomes itself a minimum.
If we assume that the masses of the points $m_1, m_2,....m_n$
behave like the whole numbers $k_1, k_2...., k_n$, so that $m_t=k_t\mu$,
then the expression, which becomes as small as possible,
consists of the sum of the magnitudes
$\frac{\mu}{4} ((d \frac{dx_i}{dt})^2+(d \frac{dy_i}{dt})^2+
(d \frac{dz_i}{dt})^2)$
for the totality of material particles $\mu$ and of magnitude -$P_{t+dt}$.
If we therefore, with Gauss, consider the magnitude
$(d \frac{dx_i}{dt})^2+(d \frac{dy_i}{dt})^2+
(d \frac{dz_i}{dt})^2$
as the measure of the deviation of the state of motion of mass
$\mu$ at time $t + dt$ from its state of motion at time $t$, then the
analysis of the total action in relation to each mass yields an
action which strives to make the deviation of its state of motion
at time $t + dt$ as small as possible relative to its state of motion
at time $t$, or an effort to preserve its state of motion, and,
additionally, an action which strives to keep the magnitude
-$P$ as small as possible.
The latter action can be analyzed into efforts to keep the
individual terms of the sum $\sum_{i, i'} F_{i, i'}(r_{i, i'})$
as small as possible, that
is, into attractions and repulsions between any two points, and
this would lead us back to the customary explanation of the
laws of motion from the law of inertia and of attraction and
repulsion; but it can also lead us back, for all natural forces
known to us, to the forces that act between contiguous spatial
elements, as will be explained in the following article on gravitation.
2. New Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy(* discovered on March 1 , 1853)
Although the title of this essay will hardly create a favorable
impression on most readers, nonetheless it seems to me to best
express the overall direction of the essay. Its purpose is to
penetrate beyond the foundations of astronomy and physics
laid by Galilei and Newton, into the interior of nature. For
astronomy, certainly these speculations cannot immediately
have any practical use, but I hope that this circumstance will
not cause any diminution of interest in the eyes of the readers
of this publication...
The foundation for those general laws of the motion of measurable
bodies that are presented at the beginning of Newton's
Principia lies in the internal state of these bodies. Let us attempt
to form an analogy between these and our own inner mode of perception. New image masses constantly arise in us
and very rapidly disappear again from our consciousness. We observe a
constant activity of our mind. Every mental act is based
upon something enduring, which is manifest (through memory)
on certain occasions, without exerting a lasting influence on
the phenomena. Thus (with every act of thinking) something
enduring continually enters our mind, which does not however,
exert a lasting influence upon the world of phenomena. Every
mental act, therefore, is based upon something enduring, which
enters our mind with the act, but at the same moment completely disappears
from the world of phenomena.
Guided by this fact, I form the hypothesis that
there is a kind of space-filling substance which
continually flows into
measurable atoms and there disappears from the world of phenomena
(the corporeal world).
2024.7.22: 세상은 hologram
태양 빛은 8분 전에 출발한 거고 전자기장의 retarded time을 그렇게 많이 봤는데... 이제야 깨닫는군. 실체가 발산하는 기가 감각기관에 도달해야 존재 인식. 따라서 인간이 육체 유지하기 위해 음식물 섭취하듯, 물질 또한 외부로부터 구조 유지 및 존재를 알리는 외부 유출용 기를 공급받을 수 밖에 없다
disappear하는 게 아니라 3차원 물질 세계에서 고차원 세계로 가는 거
Both hypotheses can be replaced by the one, that in all
measurable atoms, substance from the corporeal world continuously enters
into the world of mind. The reason the substance
disappears there is to be sought in the thought matter which
was formed in the immediately preceding period; and the pon
derable bodies are accordingly the place where the world of
mind engages the corporeal world.
(주: At every instant, a definite quantity of substance, proportional to the gravitational force, enters into every measurable atom, and disappears there.
It is a consequence of the psychology based on Herbart's work, that
substantiality accrues not to the mind but to every individual image formed
within it.)
The effect of universal gravitation, the first thing to be
explained by this hypothesis, is well known to be fully determined
for every part of space, if the potential function $P$ of all measurable
mass for this part of space be given, or, which is the same
thing, there is a function of position $P$, such that the measurable
masses contained within the closed surface $S$, are $\frac{1}{4\pi}\int{\frac{\partial P}{\partial p}}dS$
If we now assume that the substance that fills space is an
incompressible homogeneous fluid, without inertia, and that
an amount proportional to the mass of any given atom flows
into it during equal times, then obviously, the pressure exerted
on the measurable atom (will be proportional to the velocity
of the substance at the site of the atom(?))
Thus the effect of universal gravitation on a measurable atom
can be expressed through (and thought of as dependent upon)
the pressure of this space-filling substance in the immediate
neighborhood of the atom.
It necessarily follows from our hypothesis that the space
filling substance must propagate the vibrations that we perceive
as light and heat.
If we consider a simple polarized beam, and designate as $x$
the distance of an indeterminate point of this beam from a
fixed origin, and $y$ it displacement at a time $t$, then the following
equation must be at least very nearly satisfied, since the
velocity of propagation of the vibrations in space free of measurable atoms is under all conditions very nearly constant (= $\alpha$):
$y = f(x + \alpha t) + \varphi (x - \alpha t)$
For it to be strictly satisfied,
$\frac{\partial y}{\partial t}= \alpha ^2 \int^t \frac{\partial ^2 y}{\partial^2x}d\tau $
would have to apply; obviously, however, for the sake of experiment,
we can be satisfied with the equation
$\frac{\partial y}{\partial t}= \alpha ^2 \int^t \frac{\partial ^2 y}{\partial^2x} \varphi(t-\tau)d\tau $
even if $\varphi(t - \tau)$ is not equal to 1 for all positive values of $t-\tau$(which decreases ad infinitum with increasing $t-\tau$), as long
as for a sufficiently long period of time it remains very close
to 1. . . .
Let the positions of the points of the substance at a given
time $t$ be expressed by a rectangular coordinate system and let
the coordinates of an indeterminate point $0$ be $x, y, z$. Similarly,
let the coordinate of a point $0'$ be $x', y', z'$, also with regard
to a rectilinear coordinate system. Then $x', y', z'$ are functions
of $x, y, z$, and $ds'^2={dx'}^2+{dy'}^2+{dz'}^2$ will be equal to a
homogeneous quadratic expression of $dx, dy, dz$. According
to a well-known theorem, the linear expressions of $dx, dy, dz$
$\alpha_1 dx+\beta_1 dy+ \gamma_1 dz=ds_1$
$\alpha_2 dx+\beta_2 dy+ \gamma_2 dz=ds_2$
$\alpha_3 dx+\beta_3 dy+ \gamma_3 dz=ds_3$
can now always in one and only one way be determined, such
that
${dx'}^2+{dy'}^2+{dz'}^2=G_1^2{ds_1}^2+G_2^2{ds}^2+G_3^2{ds_3}^2$
while
$ds^2={dx}^2+{dy}^2+{dz}^2={ds_1}^2+{ds_2}^2+{ds_3}^2$
The magnitudes $G_1-1, G_2-1, G_3-1$ then signify the major
deformations for the particle of substance at $0$, in the transition
from the former form to the latter. I indicate them by $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$).
Now I assume that a force results from the difference between
the earlier forms of the particle of substance and its form at
time $t$, which strives to change it; and, other things being equal,
that the influence of an earlier form will become the less the
longer the time prior to $t$ when it occurred. Thus there is a limit
before which all earlier forms can be ignored. I further assume
that those states that still manifest a detectable influence differ
so slightly from the state at time $t$, that the deformations may
be regarded as infinitely small. The forces that strive to make
$\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$ small can then be regarded as linear functions of $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$; and indeed, because of the homogeneity of the aether for the total moment of these forces (the force which strives to
make $\lambda_1$ small must be a function of $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$), which remains
unchanged when we exchange $\lambda_2$ with $\lambda_3$, and the remaining
forces must follow from it, when $\lambda_2$ is exchanged with $\lambda_1$ , and
$\lambda_3$ with $\lambda_1$) we obtain the following expression:
$\delta \lambda_1(a \lambda_1+b \lambda_2+b \lambda_3) +\delta \lambda_2(b \lambda_1+a \lambda_2+b \lambda_3)+\delta \lambda_3(b \lambda_1+b \lambda_2+a \lambda_3)$
or with a somewhat changed meaning of the constants:
$\delta \lambda_1(a (\lambda_1+\lambda_2+\lambda_3)+b\lambda_1) +\delta \lambda_2(a (\lambda_1+\lambda_2+\lambda_3)+b\lambda_2)+\delta \lambda_3(a (\lambda_1+\lambda_2+\lambda_3)+b\lambda_3)$
$=\frac12 \delta (a (\lambda_1+\lambda_2+\lambda_3)^2 +b (\lambda_1^2+\lambda_2^2+\lambda_3^2))$.
Now the moment of the force that strives to change the form
of the infinitely small particle of substance at $0$, can be regarded
as resulting from forces that strive to change the length of the line elements ending at $0$. We therefore arrive at the following law of action:
If $dV$ is the volume of an infinitely small particle
of substance at point $0$ and time $t$, and $dV'$ the volume of
the same particle at time $t'$, then the force resulting from the
difference in the two states of the substance, which strives to
elongate $ds$, is expressed by
$a \frac{dV-dV'}{dV}+b \frac{ds-ds'}{ds}$
The first part of this expression derives from the force with
which a particle of substance resists a change in volume without
a change of form, the second from the force with which a
physical line element resists a change in length.
Now there is no reason to assume that the effects of both
causes change with time in accordance with the same law;
thus if we sum the effects of all earlier form of a particle of
substance upon the change of the line element $ds$ at time $t$,
then the value of $\frac{\delta ds}{dt}$, which they strive to determine, becomes
$=\int_{-\infty}^t \frac{dV'-dV}{dV}\psi(t-t')\delta t'+
\int_{-\infty}^t \frac{ds'-ds}{ds}\varphi(t-t')\delta t'$.
How then must the functions $\psi$ and $\varphi$ be constituted such that
gravitation, light, and radiant heat may be propagation through
the substance of space?
2024.7.30: 자연은 전자기장처럼 규칙적으로 움직이는데, 소위 '자유의지' '기'들이 몰이 당하면서 생긴 사태가 작금의 현상?
The effects of measurable matter upon measurable matter are:
(1) Attractive and repulsive forces inversely proportional to
the square of the distance.
(2) Light and radiant heat.
Both classes of phenomena can be explained if we assume
that the entirety of infinite space be filled with a homogeneous
substance and that every particle of that substance acts directly
only upon its immediate neighborhood.
The mathematical law in accordance with which this occurs
can be thought of as divided into
(1) the resistance of a particle of substance to a change in
volume, and
(2) the resistance of a physical line element to a change
in length.
Upon the first part are founded gravitation and electrostatic
attraction and repulsion; upon the second, the propagation
of light and heat, and electrodynamic or magnetic attraction
and repulsion.
3. Gravitation and Light
The Newtonian explanation of gravitational motion and the
motions of celestial bodies consists in the assumption of the following causes:
1. There exists an infinite space with the properties which
are assigned to it by geometry, and there exist measurable
bodies which change their positions within this space only continuously.
2. At every mass-point, there is at every moment a cause
determined by magnitude and direction, by virtue of which
cause the mass-point has a determinate motion (matter in a
determinate state of motion). The measure of this cause is velocity.
(주: Every material body, if alone in space, would either not
change its position in space or would move in a straight line with constant
velocity.
This law of motion cannot be explained by means of the Principle of
sufficient Reason: That the body continues its motion, must have a cause,
which can only be sought in the internal state of the matter.)
The phenomena to be explained here do not yet lead to the
assumption of different masses for measurable bodies.
3. At every point of space, there exists at every moment
a cause (accelerating force), determined by magnitude and
direction, which communicates a determinate motion to every
mass point present, and indeed, the same motion to each,
which combines geometrically with the motion that it already has.
4. At every mass-point in space, there exists a cause (absolute
gravity) determined by magnitude, which combines geometrically
with all other accelerating forces present there. By virtue
of this cause, at every point of space an accelerating force exists,
inversely proportional to the square of its distance from this
mass-point and directly proportional to its gravitational force.(주: The same
mass point would undergo changes in motion between two points,
whose directions coincide with the directions of the forces and whose
magnitudes are proportional to the forces.
The force divided by the change in motion, therefore, always gives the
same quotient for the same mass-point. This quotient is different for different
mass-points and is called their mass.)
The cause, determined according to magnitude and direction
(accelerating gravitational force), which, according to 3., is
found at every point in space, I seek in the
form of motion of a substance that is
continuously spread through all infinite
space, and, indeed, I assume that the direction of the motion
is equal to the direction of the force from which it is to be
explained, and the velocity is proportional to the magnitude
of the force. This substance can therefore be represented as a
physical space whose points move in geometrical space.
According to this assumption, all effects caused by measurable
bodies on measurable bodies through empty space must
be propagated by this substance. Therefore also the forms of
motion of which light and heat consist, which celestial bodies
transmit to one another, must be forms of motion of this substance.
These two phenomena, however, gravitation and the
motion of light through empty space, are the only ones that must
be explained purely by means of the motions of this substance.
Now I assume that the actual motion of the substance in
empty space is combined from the motion which must be
assumed for explanation of gravitation and that which must be
assumed for the explanation of light.
The further development of this hypothesis can be divided
into two parts in that the following are to be sought:
1. The laws of motion of the substance which must be assumed for
the explanation of the phenomena.
2 . The causes by means of which these motions can be explained.
The first subject is mathematical, the second, metaphysical.
In reference to the latter, I note in advance that the goal will
not be considered to be any explanation on the basis of causes
that strive to change the distance between two points of the
substance. This method of explanation by means of attractive
and repulsive forces owes its general application in physics
not to any direct evidence (or specific conformity to reason),
nor, apart from electricity and gravity, to its particular facility,
but on the contrary, to the circumstance that the Newtonian
law of attraction, in contradiction to the opinion of its discoverer,
has so far been considered to need no further explanation.(주: [In English]
Newton says: "That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter,
so that one body may act upon another at a distance through
a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their
action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great
an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a
competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it." See the third letter to
Bentley.)
I. Laws of motion of the substance that,
according to our assumption, causes the
phenomena of gravitation and light
Expressing the position of a point in
space by means of
rectangular coordinates $x_1, x_2, x_3$, I designate the velocity
components-parallel to the coordinates at time $t$ -of the motion that
causes the gravitational phenomena as $u_1, u_2, u_3$, and those of
the motion that causes the phenomena of light as $w_1, w_2, w_3$,
and those of the actual motion as $v_1, v_2, v_3$, so that $v=u+w$.
As will emerge from the laws of motion themselves, the
substance, if it is everywhere equally dense at one point in
time, maintains this same density everywhere at all times. I
will therefore assume this to be everywhere equal to $1$ at time $t$.
a. Motion that causes only
gravitational phenomena
The gravitational force is determined at every point by the potential function $V$, whose partial derivatives
$\frac{\partial V}{\partial x_1}, \frac{\partial V}{\partial x_2}, \frac{\partial V}{\partial x_3}$ are the components of the gravltatlonal force,
and this $V$ is in turn determined through the following conditions (disregarding an additional constant):
1. $dx_1 dx_2 dx_3 (\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_1^2} +\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_2^2}+\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_3^2})$
outside the attracting body = 0, and has for every measurable material element
a constant value. This is the product of -4$\pi$ in the absolute magnitude
of the attractive force, which according to the theory of
attraction must be assigned to it, and will be designated as $dm$.
2. If all attracting bodies are within a finite space,
$r\frac{\partial V}{\partial x_1}, r\frac{\partial V}{\partial x_2}, r\frac{\partial V}{\partial x_3}$ at an infinite distance $r$ from a point in this space
infinitely small.
Now according to our hypothesis, $\frac{\partial V}{\partial x}=u$ and consequently
$dV=u_1 dx_1 + u_2 dx_2+u_3 dx_3$
This include the conditions
(1) $\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial x_3} - \frac{\partial u_3}{\partial x_2}=0$, $\frac{\partial u_3}{\partial x_1} - \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x_3}=0$, $\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x_2} - \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial x_1}=0$
(* $\nabla \times u=0$)
(2) $(\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x_1} + \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial x_2}+
\frac{\partial u_3}{\partial x_3})dx_1dx_2dx_3=-4\pi dm$(* $\nabla \cdot u \, dx_1dx_2dx_3 = -4\pi dm$)
(3) $ru_1=0, ru_2=0, ru_3=0$ for $r=\infty$
Conversely, the magnitudes $u$, if they satisfy these conditions,
are equal to the components of the gravitational force. Since
the conditions (1) contain the possibility of a function $U$ from
which arises the differential $dU=u_1dx_1+u_2dx_2+u_3dx_3$ and thus the
derivatives $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x}=u$, and the others then yield
$U=V$+constant.*
주: This function $U$ is therefore given through observation (from relative motions)
by means of the general laws of motion, but only without taking account of
a linear function of the coordinates, because we can only observe relative
motions.
The determination of this function is based on the following
mathematical theorem: A function $V$ of position is determined within
a finite space (ignoring a constant) if it is not said to be discontinuous
along a surface, and for all of Its elements
$(\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_1^2}+\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_2^2}+\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_3^2})dx_1dx_2dx_3$ at the limit, either $V$ or its
derivative is given for an inward change of position, perpendicular to the limit(boundary). Of which it should be noted:
1. If this derivative at the bounding element $ds$ is designated by $\frac{\partial V}{\partial p}$, then
in the latter case $\int \sum\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x^2}dx_1dx_2dx_3$
must be equal to -$\int \frac{\partial V}{\partial p}ds$
through the entire space because of its bound; otherwise, in both cases, all of the determining elements can be taken arbitrarily and are therefore necessary to
the determination.
2. For a spatial element where $\sum\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x^2}$ becomes infinitely large, the product of the two is to be substituted by
-$\int \frac{\partial V}{\partial p} ds$ in relation to the limit of this element.
3. If $\sum\frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x^2}$ has a value other than zero only within a finite space, then
the boundary condition can be substituted by the statement that at an infinite
distance $R$ of a point in this space $R\frac{\partial V}{\partial x}$ becomes infinitely small.
b. Motion that causes only light phenomena
The motion that must be assumed in empty space for the explanation of the phenomena of light can be considered
(following a theorem) as composed of plane waves, that is, of such
motions where the form of motion is constant along each plane
of a family of parallel planes(wave planes). Each of these wave
systems consists then (in accord with observation) of motions
parallel to the wave plane that are propagated perpendicular
to the wave plane with a constant velocity $c$ that is the same
for all forms of motion (types of light).
If $\xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3$ are the rectangular coordinates of a point
in space for such a system of waves, the first being perpendicular, the
others parallel to the wave plane, and $\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3$
are the components of velocity at this point parallel to the coordinates at time
$t$, then we have
$\frac{\partial \omega}{\partial \xi_2} =0,
\frac{\partial \omega}{\partial \xi_3} =0$.
According to observation, first
$\omega_1=0$
second, the movement is composed of motions with velocity
$c$, one propagating from the positive side of the wave plane,
and one propagating from the negative side. If the velocity
components of the first are $\omega'$ and that of the latter are $\omega''$,
then the $\omega'$ remain unchanged if $t$ increases by $dt$ and $\xi_1$
increases by $cdt$, and the $\omega''$ are unchanged,
if $t$ increases by $dt$ and $\xi_1$ by -$cdt$, and we have
$\omega=\omega'+\omega''$. From this it follows that
$(\frac{\partial \omega'}{dt}+c\frac{\partial \omega'}{d\xi_1})dt=0, (\frac{\partial \omega''}{dt}-c\frac{\partial \omega''}{d\xi_1})dt=0$
$\frac{\partial^2 \omega '}{\partial t^2}=
-c \frac{\partial^2 \omega '}{\partial \xi_1\partial t}=cc\frac{\partial ^2 \omega '}{\partial \xi_1^2}$,
$\frac{\partial^2 \omega ''}{\partial t^2}=
c \frac{\partial^2 \omega ''}{\partial \xi_1\partial t}=cc\frac{\partial ^2 \omega ''}{\partial \xi_1^2}$
and thus
$\frac{\partial^2 \omega}{\partial t^2}
=cc\frac{\partial ^2 \omega}{\partial \xi_1^2}$
These equations give the following symmetrical results:
$\frac{\partial \omega_1}{\partial \xi_1}+\frac{\partial \omega_2}{\partial \xi_2}+\frac{\partial \omega_3}{\partial \xi_3}=0$,
$\frac{\partial ^2 \omega}{\partial t^2} =
cc(\frac{\partial ^2 \omega}{\partial \xi_1^2} +
\frac{\partial ^2 \omega}{\partial \xi_2^2} + \frac{\partial ^2 \omega}{\partial \xi_3^2})$
which, expressed in the original coordinate system, become
equations of the same form, that is,
(1) $\frac{\partial w_1}{\partial x_1}+\frac{\partial w_2}{\partial x_2}+\frac{\partial w_3}{\partial x_3}=0$,
(2) $\frac{\partial ^2 w}{\partial t^2} =cc(\frac{\partial ^2 w}{\partial x_1^2} +
\frac{\partial ^2 w}{\partial x_2^2} + \frac{\partial ^2 w}{\partial x_3^2})$
These equations are valid for every plane wave passing through
the point $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$ at time $t$ and consequently also for the
combined motion of all such plane waves.
c. Motion that causes both types of phenomena
From the conditions established for $u$ and $w$, the following conditions follow for $v$ or laws of motion of the substance in
empty space:
(I) $\frac{\partial v_1}{dx_1}+\frac{\partial v_2}{dx_2}+\frac{\partial v_3}{dx_3}=0$,
(II) $(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))
(\frac{\partial v_2}{dx_3} -\frac{\partial v_3}{\partial x_2})=0$
$(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))
(\frac{\partial v_3}{dx_1} -\frac{\partial v_1}{\partial x_3})=0$
$(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))
(\frac{\partial v_1}{dx_2} -\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial x_1})=0$,
as is easily derived if the operations are carried out.
These equations show that the motion of a point of the
substance only depends on motions in contiguous regions of
space and time, and their (complete) causes can be sought in
the effects in their neighborhood.
Equation (I) proves our earlier assertion that the density of
the substance remains unchanged during its motion; since
$\frac{\partial v_1}{dx_1}+\frac{\partial v_2}{dx_2}+\frac{\partial v_3}{dx_3}dx_1dx_2dx_3dt$,
which as a result of this equation is equal to $0$, expresses the
mass of the substance which flows into the spatial element $dx_1 dx_2 dx_3$
in time element $dt$, and therefore the mass of the substance contained in it
remains constant.
Conditions (II) are identical with the condition that
$(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))
(v_1dx_1+v_2dx_2+v_3dx_3)$
be equal to a complete differential $dW$. Now
$(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))
(w_1dx_1+w_2dx_2+w_3dx_3)=0$
and consequently
$dW = (\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3)) (u_1dx_1+u_2dx_2+u_3dx_3)$
= $(\partial^2 t - cc(\partial ^2 x_1+ \partial ^2 x_2++\partial ^2 x_3))dV$
or, since $(\partial ^2 x_1+\partial ^2 x_2+\partial ^2 x_3)dV=0$,
= $d\frac{\partial ^2 V}{\partial t^2}$
d. Common expression for the laws of motion of the
substance and the effect of gravity on the motion of
measurable bodies
The laws of these phenomena can be summed up by the
condition that the variation of the integral
$\frac12 \int [\sum(\frac{\partial \eta_i}{\partial t})^2
-cc [(\frac{\partial \eta_2}{\partial x_3} - \frac{\partial \eta_3}{\partial x_2})^2+(\frac{\partial \eta_3}{\partial x_1} - \frac{\partial \eta_1}{\partial x_3})^2+(\frac{\partial \eta_1}{\partial x_2} - \frac{\partial \eta_2}{\partial x_1})^2]dx_1dx_2dx_3]dt
\\+ \int V(\sum \frac{\partial ^2 \eta_i}{\partial x_i \partial t} dx_1 dx_2 dx_3 + 4\pi dm)dt \\ + 2 \pi \int dm \sum (\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial t})^2 dt$
becomes zero under appropriate boundary conditions.
In this expression, the first two integrals extend over the entire
geometrical space, the latter over all elements of measurable
bodies, but the coordinates of every element of measurable
bodies are to be so determined as functions of time, and $\eta_1, \eta_2, \eta_3, V$ as functions of $x_1, x_2, x_3$ and $t$, that a variation satisfying
their boundary conditions produces only a variation of the
second order of the integral.
Then the quantities $\frac{\partial \eta}{\partial t}(=v)$ are equal to the velocity components of the motion of the substance and $V$ is equal to the
potential at time $t$ at point $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$.
Translator's Notes
1 . The German expression is Gelstesmasse. It had earlier appeared in the
correspondence between Schiller and Goethe (personal communication of
George Gregory).
2. The expression
form of motion(Bewegungsform), which begins to appear here
early in the fragments,
appears as "forms of motion (types of light)"
in one late occurrence in which the subject is electromagnetic radiation.
This suggests that form of motion refers to wavelength or frequency.
3. In the fragments on psychology and metaphysics,
Riemann refers to the Erdseele.
The literal translation is earth mind or earth soul.
We have instead used the expression biosphere.
It will be helpful to the reader to keep in mind all the possibilities suggested by biosphere, earth mind, and earth soul,
in the four instances where biosphere appears in the translation.
The German Seele(soul or mind) is the equivalent of
the Greek psyche.
The Greek word also carries the meaning, that which enables life. In his
Hannonices Mundi, Kepler used anima-the nearest Latin equivalent
of psyche -as a metaphor for universal gravitation. The translator thanks
George Gregory for these observations on the Greek and Latin terms and
their use.
4. See the first of the three paragraphs marked "1" immediately preceding, which begins "1. The higher ..."
5. The German word is Denkprocess.
6. Not the paragraphs 2. and 3. immediately preceding,
but the earlier pair following the paragraph that reads,
"Emplrically, the extemal conditions of living processes in the range
of phenomena accessible to us are:"
7. "Characteristics of mind" is used for Beseeltheit.
8. Here Riemann addresses the question of the space-filling
substance, which he also calls "the aether" In one instance.
In this translation, it Is also referred
to in the expression "particle of substance", and sometimes as simply
'substance', after the concept of space-filling substance has been introduced.
These expressions for space-filling substance are thus distinct from
"measurable atoms", "measurable mass" or "measurable bodies".
9. The question mark and both pairs of parentheses appear
in the German without explanation.
Are they Riemann's marks, or
do they indicate an uncertain reading of the manuscript?
On the Hypotheses which lie at the Foundation of Geometry
Translated by M. Spivak
Plan of the Investigation
As is well known, geometry presupposes the concept of space, as well as assuming the basic principles for constructions in space. It gives only nominal definitions of these things, while their essential specifications appear in the form of axioms. The relationship between these presuppositions [the concept of space, and the basic properties of space] is left in the dark; we do not see whether, or to what extent, any connection between them is necessary, or
a priori, whether any connection between them is even possible.
From Euclid to the most famous of the modern reformers of geometry, Legendre, this darkness has been dispelled neither by the mathematicians nor by the philosophers who have concerned themselves with it. This is undoubtedly because the general concept of multiply extended quantities, which includes spatial quantities, remains completely unexplored. I have therefore first set myself the task of constructing the concept of a multiply extended quantity from general notions of quantity. It will be shown that a multiply extended quantity is susceptible of various metric relations, so that space constitutes only a special case of a triply extended quantity. From this however it is a necessary consequence that the theorems of geometry cannot be deduced from general notions of quantity, but that those properties which distinguish Space from other conceivable triply extended quantities can only be deduced from experience. Thus arises the problem of seeking out the simplest data from which the metric relations of Space can be determined, a problem which by its
very nature is not completely determined, for there may be several systems of simple data which suffice to determine the metric relations of Space; for the present purposes, the most important system is that laid down as a foundation of geometry by Euclid. These data are - like all data - not logically necessary, but only of empirical certainty, they are hypotheses; one can therefore investigate their likelihood, which is certainly very great within the bounds of observation, and afterwards decide upon the legitimacy of extending them beyond the bounds of observation, both in the direction of the immeasurably large, and in the direction of the immeasurably small.
I. Concept of an $n$-fold extended quantity
In proceeding to attempt the solution of the first of these problems, the development of the concept of multiply extended quantity, I feel particularly entitled to request an indulgent criticism, as I am little practiced in these tasks of a philosophical nature where the difficulties lie more in the concepts than in the construction, and because I could not make use of any previous studies, except for some very brief hints on the subject which Privy Councillor Gauss has given in his second memoir on Biquadratic Residues, in the Göttingen
Gelehrte Anzeige, and in the Göttingen Jubilee-book, and some
philosophical researches of Herbart.
1.
Notions of quantity are possible only when there already exists a general concept which admits particular instances. These instances form either a con tinuous or a discrete manifold, depending on whether or not a continuous tran sition of instances can be found between any two of them; individual instances
are called points in the first case and elements of the manifold in the second. Concepts whose particular instances form a discrete manifold are so numerous that some concept can always be found, at least in the more highly developed languages, under which any given collection of things can be comprehended (and consequently, in the study of discrete quantities, mathematicians could unhesitatingly proceed from the principle that given objects are to be regarded as all of one kind). On the other hand, opportunities for creating concepts whose instances form a continuous manifold occur so seldom in everyday life that color and the position of sensible objects are perhaps the only simple concepts whose instances form a multiply extended manifold. More frequent opportunities for creating and developing these concepts first occur in higher mathematics.
Particular portions of a manifold, distinguished by a mark or by a boundary, are called quanta. Their quantitative comparison is effected in the case of discrete quantities by counting, in the case of continuous quantities by measurement. Measuring involves the superposition of the quantities to be compared; it therefore requires a means of transporting one quantity to be used as a standard for the others. Otherwise, one can compare two quantities only when one is a part of the other, and then only as to "more" or "less", not as to "how much". The investigations which can be carried out in this case form
a general division of the science of quantity, independent of measurement, where quantities are regarded, not as existing independent of position and not as expressible in terms of a unit, but as regions in a manifold. Such inves tigations have become a necessity for several parts of mathematics, e.g., for the treatment of many-valued analytic functions, and the dearth of such studies
is one of the principal reasons why the celebrated theorem of Abel and the contributions of Lagrange, Pfaff and Jacobi to the general theory of differential equations have remained unfruitful for so long. From this portion of the science of extended quantity, a portion which proceeds without any further assumptions, it suffices for the present purposes to emphasize two points, which will make clear the essential characteristic of an $n$-fold extension. The first of these concerns the generation of the concept of a multiply extended manifold, the second involves reducing position fixing in a given manifold to numerical determinations.
2.
In a concept whose instances form a continuous manifold, if one passes from one instance to another in a well-determined way, the instances through which one has passed form a simply extended manifold, whose essential charac teristic is, that from any point in it a continuous movement is possible in only two directions, forwards and backwards. If one now imagines that this manifold passes to another, completely different one, and once again in a well determined way, that is, so that every point passes to a well-determined point of the other, then the instances form, similarly, a double extended manifold.
In a similar way, one obtains a triply extended manifold when one imagines that a doubly extended one passes in a well-determined way to a completely different one, and it is easy to see how one can continue this construction. If one considers the process as one in which the objects vary, instead of regarding the concept as fixed, then this construction can be characterized as a synthesis of a variability of $n+1$ dimensions from a variability of $n$ dimensions and a variability of one dimension.
3.
I will now show, conversely, how one can break up a variability, whose boundary is given, into a variability of one dimension and a variability of lower dimension. One considers a piece of a manifold of one dimension - with a fixed origin, so that points of it may be compared with one another - vary ing so that for every point of the given manifold it has a definite value, continuously changing with this point. In other words, we take within the given manifold a continuous function of position, which, moreover, is not con stant on any part of the manifold. Every system of points where the function has a constant value then forms a continuous manifold of fewer dimensions than the given one. These manifolds pass continuously from one to another as the function changes; one can therefore assume that they all emanate from one of them, and generally speaking this will occur in such a way that every point of the first passes to a definite point of any other; the exceptional cases, whose investigation is important, need not be considered here. In this way, the determination of position in the given manifold is reduced to a numerical determination and to the determination of position in a manifold of fewer dimensions. It is now easy to show that this manifold has n-1 dimensions, if the given manifold is an n-fold extension. By an n-time repetition of this process, the determination of position in an n-fold extended manifold is reduced to n numerical determinations, and therefore the determination of position in a given manifold is reduced, whenever this is possible, to a finite number of numerical determinations. There are, however, also manifolds in which the fixing of position requires not a finite number, but either an infinite sequence or a continuous manifold of numerical measurements. Such manifolds form, e.g., the possibilities for a function in a given region, the possible shapes of a solid figure, etc.
II. Metric relations of which a manifold of n dimensions is susceptible, on the assumption that lines have a length independent of their configuration,
so that every line can be measured by every other
Now that the concept of an $n$-fold extended manifold has been constructed, and its essential characteristic has been found in the fact that position fixing in the manifold can be reduced to n numerical determinations, there follows, as the second of the problems proposed above, an investigation of the metric relations of which such a manifold is susceptible, and of the conditions which suffice to determine them. These metric relations can be investigated only in abstract terms, and their interdependence exhibited only through formulas. Under certain assumptions, however, one can resolve them into relations which are individually capable of geometric representation, and in this way it becomes possible to express the results of calculation geometrically.
Thus, although an abstract investigation with formulas certainly cannot be avoided, the results can be presented in geometric garb. The foundations of both parts of the question are contained in the celebrated treatise of Privy Councillor Gauss on curved surfaces.
1.
Measurement requires an independence of quantity from position, which can occur in more than one way. The hypothesis which first presents itself, and which I shall develop here, is just this, that the length of lines is indepen dent of their configuration, so that every line can be measured by every other.
If position-fixing is reduced to numerical determinations, so that the position of a point in the given n-fold extended manifold is expressed by $n$ varying
quantities $x_1, x_2, x_3$ and so forth up to $x_n$, then specifying a line amounts to giving the quantities $x$ as functions of one variable. The
problem then is, to set up a mathematical expression for the length of a line, for which purpose the quantities $x$ must be thought of as expressible in units.
I will treat this problem only under certain restrictions, and I first limit myself to lines in which the ratios of the quantities $dx$ - the increments in the quantities $x$ - vary continuously. One can then regard the lines as broken up into elements within which the ratios of the quantities $dx$ may be considered to be constant. The problem then reduces to setting up a general expression for the line element ds at every point, an expression which will involve the quantities $x$ and the quantities $dx$.
I assume, secondly, that the length of the line element remains unchanged, up to first order, when all the points of this line element suffer the same infinitesimal displacement, whereby I simply mean that if all the quantities $dx$ increase in the same ratio, the line element changes by the same ratio. Under these assumptions, the line element can be an arbitrary homogeneous function of the first degree in the quantities $dx$ which remains the same when all the quan tities $dx$ change sign, and in which the arbitrary constants are functions of the quantities $x$.
To find the simplest cases, I first seek an expression for the ($n-1$)-fold extended manifolds which are everywhere equidistant from the origin of the line element, i.e., I seek a continuous function of position which distinguishes them from one another. This must either decrease or increase in all directions from the origin; I will assume that it increases in all directions and therefore has a minimum at the origin. Then if its first and second differential quotients are finite, the first order differential must vanish and the second order differential cannot be negative; I assume that it is always positive. This differential expression of the second order remains constant if $ds$ remains constant and increases quadratically when the
quantities $dx$, and thus also $ds$, all increase in the same ratio; it is
therefore equal to a constant times $ds^2$ and consequently $ds$ equals the
squareroot of an everywhere positive homogeneous function of the second degree in the quantities $dx$ in which the coefficients are continuous functions of the quantities $x$. In Space, if one expresses the location of a point by
rectilinear coordinates, then $ds =\sqrt{\sum(dx)}^2$; Space is therefore included in this simplest case.
The next simplest case would perhaps include the manifolds in which the line element can be expressed as the fourth root of a differential expression of the fourth degree. Investigation of this more general class would actually require no essentially different principles, but it would be rather time consuming and throw proportionally little new light on the study of Space, especially since the results cannot be expressed geometrically; I consequently restrict myself to those manifolds where the line element can be expressed by the square root of a differential expression of the second degree. One can transform such an expression into another similar one by substituting for the $n$ independent variables, functions of $n$ new independent variables.
However, one cannot transform any expression into any other in this way; for
the expression contains $n \frac{n+1}{2}$ coefficients which are arbitrary functions of
the independent variables; by the introduction of new variables one can satisfy only n conditions, and can therefore make only $n$ of the coefficients equal
to given quantities. There remain $n \frac{n-1}{2}$ others, already completely determined
by the nature of the manifold to be represented, and consequently $n \frac{n-1}{2}$ functions of position are required to determine its metric relations.
Manifolds, like the Plane and Space, in which the line element can be brought into the form $\sqrt{\sum{dx^2}}$ thus constitute only a special case of the manifolds to be investigated here; they clearly deserve a special name, and consequently, these manifolds, in which the square of the lines element can be expressed as the sum of the squares of complete differentials, I propose to call flat. In order to survey the essential differences of the manifolds representable in the assumed form, it is necessary to eliminate the features depending on the
mode of presentation, which is accomplished by choosing the variable quantities according to a definite principle.
2.
For this purpose, one constructs the system of shortest lines emanating from a given point; the position of an arbitrary point can then be determined by the initial direction of the shortest line in which it lies, and its distance, in this line, from the initial point. It can therefore be expressed by the ratios of the quantities $dx^0$ , i.e., the quantities $dx$ at the origin of
this shortest line, and by the length $s$ of this line. In place of the $dx^0$ one now introduces linear expressions $d\alpha$ formed from them in such a way that the initial value of the square of the line element will be equal to the sum of the squares of these expressions, so that the independent variables are: the quantity $s$ and the ratio of the quantities $d\alpha$.
Finally, in place of
the $d\alpha$ choose quantities $x_1, x_2, \cdot \cdot \cdot, x_n$ proportial to them, but such that the sum of their squares equals $s^2$.
If one introduces these quantities, then
for infinitely small values of $x$ the square of the line element equals
$\sum{dx^2}$, but the next order term in its expansion equals a
homogeneous expression of the second degree in the $n\frac{n-1}{2}$
quantities $(x_1 dx_2 -x_2 dx_1), (x_1 dx_3 -x_3 dx_1), \cdot \cdot \cdot,$
and is consequently an infinitely small quantity of the fourth order,
so that one obtains a finite quantity if one divides it by the square of
the infinitely small triangle at whose vertices the variables have the
values $(0,0,0,...), (x_1,x_2,x_3, ... ), (dx_1,dx_2,dx_3, ... )$.
This quantity remains the same as long as the quantities $x$ and $dx$ are
contained in the same binary
linear forms, or as long as the two shortest lines from the initial point
to $x$ and from the initial point to $dx$ remain in the same surface
element, and therefore depends only on the position and direction of that
element. It obviously equals zero if the manifold in question is flat,
i.e., if the square of the line element is reducible to $\sum{dx^2}$
and can therefore be regarded as the measure of deviation from flatness in
this surface direction at this point. When multiplied by -$\frac34$
it becomes equal to the quantity which Privy Councillor
Gauss has called the curvature of a surface.
Previously, $n \frac{n-1}2$ functions of position were found necessary in
order to determine the metric relations of an $n$-fold extended manifold
representable in the assumed form; hence if the curvature is given in
$n \frac{n-1}2$ surface directions at every point, then the metric
relations of the manifold may be determined, provided only that no identical
relations can be found between these values, and indeed in general this
does not occur.
The metric relations of these manifolds, in which the line element can be
represented as the square root of a differential expression of the second
degree, can thus be expressed in a way completely independent of the choice
of the varying quantities. A similar path to the same goal could also be
taken in those manifolds in which the line element is expressed in a less
simple way, e.g., by the fourth root of a differential expression of the
fourth degree. The line element in this more general case would not be
reducible to the square root of a quadratic sum of differential expressions,
and therefore in the expression for the square of the line element the
deviation from flatness would be an infinitely small quantity of the second
dimension, whereas for the other manifolds it was an infinitely small
quantity of the fourth dimension. This peculiarity of the latter manifolds
therefore might well be called planeness in the smallest parts. For present
purposes, however, the most important peculiarity of these manifolds, on
whose account alone they have been examined here, is this, that the metric
relations of the doubly extended ones can be represented geometrically by
surfaces and those of the multiply extended ones can be reduced to those of
the surfaces contained within them, which still requires a brief discussion.
3.
In the conception of surfaces, the inner metric relations, which involve
only the lengths of paths within them, are always bound up with the way the
surfaces are situated with respect to points outside them. We may, however,
abstract from external relations by considering deformations which leave
the lengths of lines within the surfaces unaltered, i.e., by considering
arbitrary bendings - without stretching - of such surfaces, and by regarding
all surfaces obtained from one another in this way as equivalent. Thus, for
example, arbitrary cylindrical or conical surfaces count as equivalent to a
plane, since they can be formed from a plane by mere bending, under which
the inner metric relations remain the same; and all theorems about the plane
- hence all of planimetry - retain their validity. On the other hand, they
count as essentially different from the sphere, which cannot be transformed
into the plane without stretching. According to the previous investigations,
the inner metric relations at every point of a doubly extended quantity, if
its line element can be expressed as the square root of a differential
expression of the second degree, which is the case with surfaces, is
characterized by the curvature. For surfaces, this quantity can be given a
visual interpretation as the product of the two curvatures of the surface
at this point, or by the fact that its product with an infinitely small
triangle formed from shortest lines is, in proportion to the radius, half
the excess of the sum of its angles over two right angles [that is, equal
to the excess of the sum over $\pi$, when the angles are measured in
radians]. The first definition would presuppose the theorem that the
product of the two radii of curvatures is unaltered by mere bendings of a
surface, the second, that at each point the excess over two right angles of
the sum of the angles of any infinitely small triangle is proportional to
its area. To give a tangible meaning to the curvature of an $n$-fold
extended manifold at a given point, and in a given surface direction
through it, we first mention that a shortest line emanating from a point is
completely determined if its initial direction is given. Consequently we
obtain a certain surface if we prolong all the initial directions from the
given point which lie in the given surface element, into shortest lines;
and this surface has a definite curvature at the given point, which is equal
to the curvature of the $n$-fold extended manifold at the given point, in
the given surface direction.
4.
Before applying these results to Space, it is still necessary to make some
general considerations about flat manifolds, i.e., about manifolds in which
the square of the line element can be represented as the sum of squares of
complete differentials.
In a flat $n$-fold extended manifold the curvature in every direction, at
every point, is zero; but according to the preceding investigation, in order
to determine the metric relations it suffices to know that at each point the
curvature is zero in $\frac12 n(n-1)$ independent surface-direction. The
manifolds whose curvature is everywhere $0$ can be considered as a special
case of those manifolds whose curvature is everywhere constant. The common
character of those manifolds whose curvature is constant may be expressed
as follows: figures can be moved in them without stretching. For obviously
figures could not be freely shifted and rotated in them if the curvature
were not the same in all directions, at all points. On the other hand, the
metric properties of the manifold are
completely determined by the curvature; they are therefore exactly
the same in all the directions
around any one point as in the directions around any other, and thus the
same constructions can be effected starting from either; consequently, in
the manifolds with constant curvature figures may be given any arbitrary
position. The metric relations of these manifolds depend only on the value
of the curvature, and it may be mentioned, as regards the analytic
presentation, that if one denotes this value by $\alpha$, then the
expression for the line element can be put in the form
$\frac{1}{1+\frac{\alpha}{4} \sum{x^2} }
{\sqrt{\sum{dx^2}}}$
5.
The consideration of surfaces with constant curvature may serve for
a geometric illustration. It is easy to see that the surfaces whose
curvature is positive can always be rolled onto a sphere whose radius is
the reciprocal of the curvature; but in order to survey the multiplicity of
these surfaces, let one of them be given the shape of a sphere, and the
others the shape of surfaces of rotation which touch it along the equator.
The surfaces with greater curvature than the sphere will then touch the
sphere from inside and take a form like the portion of the surface of a
ring, which is situated away from the axis; they could be rolled upon zones
of spheres with smaller radii, but would go round more than once.
Surfaces with smaller positive curvature are obtained from spheres of larger
radii by cutting out a portion bounded by two great semi-circles, and
bringing together the cut-lines. The surface of curvature zero will be a
cylinder standing on the equator; the surfaces with negative curvature will
touch this cylinder from outside and be formed like the part of the surface
of a ring which is situated near the axis. If one regards these surfaces as
possible positions for pieces of surface moving in them, as Space is for
bodies, then pieces of surface can be moved in all these surfaces without
stretching. The surfaces with positive curvature can always
be so formed that pieces of surface can even be moved arbitrarily without
bending, namely as spherical surfaces, but those with negative curvature
cannot.
Aside from this independence of position for surface pieces, in surfaces
with zero curvature there is also an independence of position for
directions, which does not hold in the other surfaces.
III. Application to Space
1.
Following these investigations into the determination of the metric rela tions of an n-fold extended quantity, the conditions may be given which are sufficient and necessary for determining the metric relations of Space, if we assume beforehand the independence of lines from configuration and the possi bility of expressing the line element as the square root of a second order differential expression, and thus flatness in the smallest parts.
First, these conditions may be expressed by saying that the curvature at every point equals zero in three surface directions, and thus the metric relations of Space are implied if the sum of the angles of a triangle always equals two right angles.
But secondly, if one assumes with Euclid not only the existence of lines independently of configuration, but also of bodies, then it follows that the curvature is everywhere constant, and the angle sum in all triangles is determined if it is known in one.
In the third place, finally, instead of assuming the length of lines to be independent of place and direction, one might assume that their length and direction is independent of place. According to this conception, changes or differences in position are complex quantities expressible in three independent units.
2.
In the course of the previous considerations, the relations of extension or
regionality were first distinguished from the metric relations, and it was
found that different metric relations were conceivable along with the same
relations of extension; then systems of simple metric specifications were
sought by means of which the metric relations of Space are completely
determined, and from which all theorems about it are a necessary
consequence. It remains now to discuss the question how, to what degree,
and to what extent these assumptions are borne out by experience. In this
connection there is an essential difference between mere relations of
extension and metric relations, in that among the first, where the possible
cases form a discrete manifold, the declarations of experience are to sure
never completely certain, but they are not inexact, while for the second,
where the possible cases form a continuous manifold, every determination
from experience always remains inexact
- be the probability ever so great that it is nearly exact. This
circumstance becomes important when these empirical determinations are
extended beyond the limits of observation into the immeasurably large and
the immeasurably small; for the latter may obviously become ever more
inexact beyond the boundary of observation, but not so the former.
When constructions in Space are extended into the innneasurably
large, unboundedness is to be distinguished from infinitude; one belongs to
relations of extension, the other to metric relations. That Space is an
unbounded triply extended manifold is an assumption which is employed for
every apprehension of the external world, by which at every moment the
domain of actual perception is supplemented, and by which the possible
locations of a sought for object are constructed; and in these applications
it is continually confirmed. The unboundedness of space consequently has a
greater empirical certainty than any experience of the external world. But
its infinitude does not in any way follow from this; quite to the contrary,
Space would necessarily be finite if one asswned independence of bodies
from position, and thus ascribed to it a constant curvature, as long as this
curvature had ever so small a positive value. If one prolonged the initial
directions lying in a surface direction into shortest lines, one would
obtain an unbounded surface with constant positive curvature, and thus a
surface which in a flat triply extended manifold would take the form of a
sphere, and consequently be finite.
3.
Questions about the immeasurably large are idle questions for the
explanation of Nature. But the situation is quite different with questions
about the immeasurably small. Upon the exactness with which we pursue
phenomenon into the infinitely small, does our knowledge of their causal
connections essentially depend. The progress of recent centuries in
understanding the mechanisms of Nature depends almost entirely on the
exactness of construction which has become possible through the invention
of the analysis of the infinite and through the simple principles
discovered by Archimedes, Galileo and Newton, which modern physics makes
use of. By contrast, in the natural sciences where the simple principles
for such constructions are still lacking, to discover causal connections
one pursues phenomenon into the spatially small, just so far as the
microscope permits. Questions about the metric relations of Space in the
immeasurably small are thus not idle ones.
If one assumes that bodies exist independently of position, then
the curvature is everywhere constant, and it then follows from astronomical
measurements that it cannot be different from zero; or at any rate its
reciprocal must be an area in comparison with which the range of our
telescopes can be neglected. But if such an independence of bodies from
position does not exist, then one cannot draw conclusions about metric
relations in the infinitely small from those in the large; at every point
the curvature can have arbitrary values in three directions, provided only
that the total curvature of every measurable portion of Space is not
perceptibly different from zero. Still more complicated relations can
occur if the line element cannot be represented, as was presupposed, by the
square root of a differential expression of the second degree. Now it seems
that the empirical notions on which the metric determinations of Space are
based, the concept of a solid body and that of a light ray, lose their
validity in the infinitely small; it is therefore quite definitely
conceivable that the metric relations of Space in the infinitely small do
not conform to the hypotheses of geometry; and in fact one ought to assume
this as soon as it permits a simpler way of explaining phenomena.
The question of the validity of the hypotheses of geometry in the
infinitely small is connected with the question of the basis for the metric
relations of space. In connection with this question, which may indeed still
be ranked as part of the study of Space, the above remark is applicable,
that in a discrete manifold the principle of metric relations is already
contained in the concept of the manifold, but in a continuous one it must
come from something else. Therefore, either the reality underlying Space
must form a discrete manifold, or the basis for the metric relations must be
sought outside it, in binding forces acting upon it.
An answer to these questions can be found only by starting from
that conception of phenomena which has hitherto been approved by experience,
for which Newton laid the foundation, and gradually modifying it under the
compulsion of facts which cannot be explained by it. Investigations like the
one just made, which begin from general concepts, can serve only to insure
that this work is not hindered by too restricted concepts, and that progress
in comprehending the connection of things is not obstructed by traditional
prejudices.
This leads us away into the doamin of another science, the realm
of physics, into which the nature of the present occasion does not allow us
to enter.
Synopsis
Plan of the Inquiry:
I. Notion of an $n$-ply extended magnitude.
§1.
Continuous and discrete manifoldnesses. Defined parts of a
manifoldness are called Quanta. Division of the theory of
continuous magnitude into the theories,
(1)
Of mere region-relations, in which an independence of magnitudes
from position is not assumed;
(2)
Of size-relations, in which such an independence must be assumed.
§2.
Construction of the notion of a one-fold, two-fold, $n$-fold
extended magnitude.
§3.
Reduction of place-fixing in a given manifoldness to
quantity-fixings. True character of an $n$-fold extended
magnitude.
II.
Measure-relations of which a manifoldness of $n$-dimensions is
capable on the assumption that lines have a length independent of
position, and consequently that every line may be measured by
every other.
§1.
Expression for the line-element. Manifoldnesses to be called
Flat in which the line-element is expressible as the square root
of a sum of squares of complete differentials.
§2.
Investigation of the manifoldness of $n$-dimensions in which the
line element may be represented as the square root of a quadric
differential. Measure ofits deviation from flatness (curvature)
at a given point in a given surface-direction. For the
determination of its measure-relations it is allowable and
sufficient that the curvature be arbitrarily given at every point
in $\frac12 n(n-1)$ surface directions.
§3.
Geometric illustration.
§4.
Flat manifoldnesses (in which the curvature is everywhere = $0$)
may be treated as a special case of manifoldnesses with constant
curvature. These can also be defined as admitting an
independence of $n$-fold extents in them from position
(possibility of motion without stretching).
§5.
Surfaces with constant curvature.
III. Application to Space.
§1.
System of facts which suffice to determine the measure-relations
of space assumed in geometry.
§2.
How far is the validity of these empirical determinations
probable beyond the limits of observation towards the infinitely
great?
§3.
How far towards the infinitely small? Connection of this
question with the interpretation of nature.
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